Spatial coordinates and phenomenology in the two visual systems model

Gangopadhyay, Nivedita; Madary, Michael; Spicer, Finn; Jacob, Pierre; Vignemont, Frédérique de

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199551118.003.0008

Cited by 30 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 53 publications

(90 reference statements)

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“…In cognitive science, the interdependence of perception and action has been variously spelt out over a range of theories, starting from the weak interdependence view of loose and pragmatic causal interaction to the strong claim that perception and action are co-constitutive. At one end of the spectrum, we find theories which defend a functional dichotomy between perceptual awareness and the perceiver's sensorimotor engagement with the world Goodale 1995, 2010;Jacob and de Vignemont 2010). These theories do not rule out the fact that, in normal everyday scenarios, there is communication between perception and action but the mechanisms of perceptual awareness are nonetheless distinct from those of sensorimotor interaction.…”

Section: Smart Perception and Extended Mind: Going Wild Scenariomentioning

confidence: 87%

The extended mind: born to be wild? A lesson from action-understanding

Gangopadhyay

2011

Phenom Cogn Sci

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The extended mind hypothesis (Clark and Chalmers in Analysis 58(1): 7-19, 1998;Clark 2008) is an influential hypothesis in philosophy of mind and cognitive science. I argue that the extended mind hypothesis is born to be wild. It has undeniable and irrepressible tendencies of flouting grounding assumptions of the traditional information-processing paradigm. I present case-studies from social cognition which not only support the extended mind proposal but also bring out its inherent wildness. In particular, I focus on cases of action-understanding and discuss the role of embodied intentionality in the extended mind project. I discuss two theories of action-understanding for exploring the support for the extended mind hypothesis in embodied intersubjective interaction, namely, simulation theory and a non-simulationist perceptual account. I argue that, if the extended mind adopts a simulation theory of action-understanding, it rejects representationalism. If it adopts a non-simulationist perceptual account of action-understanding, it rejects the classical sandwich view of the mind.

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Section: Smart Perception and Extended Mind: Going Wild Scenariomentioning

confidence: 87%

The extended mind: born to be wild? A lesson from action-understanding

Gangopadhyay

2011

Phenom Cogn Sci

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“…Another disorder to consider here, since it sometimes results from PFC damage (to the frontal eye-fields (FEF)), is hemispatial neglect, a condition which consists of an inability to notice items appearing in the contralesional half of one's visual field, usually the left (Husain & Kennard, 1996). However, since FEF is part of an attentional network (Bartolomeo et al, 2007), the patients' inability to notice left-located items can be entirely explained by the attentional deficits that the FEF damage causes (Brogaard, 2011a(Brogaard, , 2011bJacob & de Vignemont, 2010; see esp. Kozuch, 2014Kozuch, , 2022, there again being no need to hypothesize a lack of consciousness.…”

Section: Review Of Lesion Evidencementioning

confidence: 99%

A Legion of Lesions: The Neuroscientific Rout of Higher-Order Thought Theory

Kozuch

2023

Erkenn

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Higher-order thought (HOT) theory says that a mental state is conscious when and only when represented by a conceptual, belief-like mental state. Plausibly, HOT theory predicts the impairment of HOT-producing brain areas to cause significant deficits in consciousness. This means that HOT theory can be refuted by identifying those brain areas that are candidates for producing HOTs, then showing that damage to these areas never produces the expected deficits of consciousness. Building this refutation is a work-in-progress, with several key components of it already existing in the literature (e.g.,

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“…Ungerleider and Mishkin 1982;Milner and Goodale 1995, 2004. More specifically, Jacob and de Vignemont (2010) suggest that despite interacting strongly, visual perception and visuo-motor behavior are functionally distinct. Similar views can be found, amongst others, in Jacob and Jeannerod (2003) who argue that P&A are cognitively distinct.…”

Section: How Are Panda Related?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Perception, Action and the Notion of Grounding

Tillas

Vosgerau

2016

Fundamental Issues of Artificial Intelligence

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Traditionally, philosophers and cognitive scientists alike considered the mind as divided into input units (perception), central processing (cognition), and output units (action). In turn, they allowed for little -if any -direct interaction between perception and action. In recent years, theorists challenged the classical view of the mind by arguing that bodily states ground cognition. Even though promising, the notion of grounding is largely underspecified. In this paper, we focus on the debate about the relation between perception and action in order to flesh out the process and in turn clarify the notion of grounding. Given that currently the debate about the relation between perception & action is far from settled, we attempt an assessment of the implications that possible outcomes of this debate would have on Grounding Cognition Theories. Interestingly, some of these possible outcomes seem to threaten the overall program of Grounded Cognition. In an attempt to make this analysis more concrete, we study two closely related speculative hypotheses about possible ways in which perception and action interact. Namely, we focus on Theory of Event Coding and Simulation Theory, and evaluate the levels of compatibility between those two views and Grounded Cognition Theories.

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Spatial coordinates and phenomenology in the two visual systems model

Cited by 30 publications

References 53 publications

The extended mind: born to be wild? A lesson from action-understanding

The extended mind: born to be wild? A lesson from action-understanding

A Legion of Lesions: The Neuroscientific Rout of Higher-Order Thought Theory

Perception, Action and the Notion of Grounding

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