Spatial Problem Solving in Spatial Structures

Freksa, Christian; Olteteanu, Ana-Maria; Barkowsky, Thomas; Ven, Jasper van de; Schultheis, Holger

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-69456-6_2

Cited by 2 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…Can we find any examples that clearly speak in favor of EC based on this notion of behavior unspecificity? Consider an example well known in the EC literature: gestures (Chu & Kita, ; Freksa, Olteţeanu, Barkowsky, van de Ven & Schultheis, ; Goldin‐Meadow & Alibali, ; Wesp, Hesse, Keutmann & Wheaton, ). In his () book, Andy Clark—in line with the present approach—argues for the claim that gestures can constitute thought.…”

Section: Meeting the Cte: What Are Cognitive Constituents?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…It is very unlikely to find any mechanism that is shared by all these capacities. Indeed, the role of gestures is usually discussed in the context of the investigation of spatial problem solving (Chu & Kita, ; Freksa et al, ; Hostetter & Alibali, ), that is, of the cognitive capacity for solving spatial problems (the input is “being presented with a spatial problem,” the output is “presenting a solution”). As manifestations of this capacity, researchers investigate behaviors with respect to, for example, mental rotation tasks, route learning tasks, or rotating gear tasks.…”

Section: Meeting the Cte: What Are Cognitive Constituents?mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Extended cognition, the new mechanists' mutual manipulability criterion, and the challenge of trivial extendedness

Krickel

2019

Mind & Language

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The dispute between defenders and opponents of extended cognition (EC) has come to a dead end as no agreement on what the mark of the cognitive is could be found. Recently, many authors, therefore, have pursued a different strategy: they focus on the notion of constitution rather than the notion of cognition to determine whether constituents of cognitive phenomena can be external to the brain. One common strategy is to apply the new mechanists' mutual manipulability account (MM). In this paper, I will analyze whether this strategy can be successful. Thereby, I will focus on David Kaplan's (2012) version of this strategy. It will turn out that MM alone is insufficient for answering the question whether EC is true or not. What I call the Challenge of Trivial Extendedness arises due to the fact that mechanisms for cognitive behaviors are extended in a way that nobody would want to count as cases of EC. I will argue that this challenge can be met by adding a further necessary condition: cognitive constituents of mechanisms satisfy MM and they are what I call behavior unspecific.

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