Spatial representations in sensory modalities

2024

Psychological Review

When a circular coin is rotated in depth, is there any sense in which it comes to resemble an ellipse? While this question is at the center of a rich and divided philosophical tradition (with some scholars answering affirmatively and some negatively), Morales et al. (2020, 2021) took an empirical approach, reporting 10 experiments whose results favor such perspectival similarity. Recently, Burge and Burge (2022) offered a vigorous critique of this work, objecting to its approach and conclusions on both philosophical and empirical grounds. Here, we answer these objections on both fronts. We show that Burge and Burge’s critique rests on misunderstandings of Morales et al.’s claims; of the relation between the data and conclusions; and of the philosophical context in which the work appears. Specifically, Burge and Burge attribute to us a much stronger (and stranger) view than we hold, involving the introduction of “a new entity” located “in some intermediate position(s) between the distal shape and the retinal image.” We do not hold this view. Indeed, once properly understood, most of Burge and Burge’s objections favor Morales et al.’s claims rather than oppose them. Finally, we discuss several questions that remain unanswered, and reflect on a productive path forward on these issues of foundational scientific and philosophical interest.

Section: Perspectival Similarity Without “A New Entity”: Do We (Dis)a...mentioning

confidence: 97%

Section: Moving Forwardmentioning

confidence: 99%

Empirical evidence for perspectival similarity.

Morales¹,

2024

Psychological Review

Section: Perspectival Similarity Without "A New Entity"mentioning

confidence: 97%

“…Linton (2021), even while criticizing our work, shares a creative design using an elliptical cloud of points whose shape is visually distorted in different ways under monocular and binocular viewing conditions. Finally, Cheng (2022) outlines a neuroimaging approach based on repetition suppression. Still other empirical work could more directly explore the role of conscious awareness in these phenomena and results, which we discuss only briefly in our own work but which merits independent investigation (see, e.g., discussion in Cohen, 2021;Green, 2021;Morales, 2021).…”

Section: Empirical Optimism and Future Directionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Empirical evidence for perspectival similarity

Morales¹,

2022

Preprint

When a circular coin is rotated in depth, is there any sense in which it comes to resemble an ellipse? While this question is at the center of a rich and divided philosophical tradition (with some scholars answering affirmatively and some negatively), Morales et al. (2020, 2021a) took an empirical approach, reporting 10 experiments whose results favor such perspectival similarity. Recently, Burge and Burge (2022) offered a vigorous critique of this work, objecting to its approach and conclusions on both philosophical and empirical grounds. Here, we answer these objections on both fronts. We show that Burge and Burge’s critique rests on misunderstandings of Morales et al.’s claims; of the relation between the data and conclusions; and of the philosophical context in which the work appears. Specifically, Burge and Burge attribute to us a much stronger (and stranger) view than we hold, involving the introduction of “a new entity” located “in some intermediate position(s) between the distal shape and the retinal image”. We do not hold this view. Indeed, once properly understood, most of Burge and Burge’s objections favor Morales et al.’s claims rather than oppose them. Finally, we discuss several questions that remain unanswered, and reflect on a productive path forward on these issues of foundational scientific and philosophical interest.

“…This finding too has fed back into philosophical discussions, with some arguing that "perspectival similarity is real and efficacious" (Green, 2021), others questioning the theoretical implications (see, e.g., Burge and Burge, 2022, and replies by Morales andFirestone, 2023 andCheng et al, 2022), and still others suggesting follow-up experiments to explore this issue further (Cheng, 2022).…”

Section: The Puzzle Of Perspectival Appearancementioning

confidence: 99%

Philosophy of Perception in the Psychologist’s Laboratory

Morales¹,

2023

Preprint

Perception is our primary means of accessing the external world. What is the nature of this core mental process? Although this question is at the center of scientific research on perception, it has also long been explored by philosophers, who ask fundamental questions about our capacity to perceive: Do our different senses represent the world in commensurable ways? How much of our environment can we be aware of at one time? Which aspects of perception are ‘objective’, and which ‘subjective’? What properties count as perceptual in the first place? Although these parallel research programs typically proceed independently in contemporary scholarship, previous eras recognized more active collaboration and interaction across philosophical and scientific approaches to perception. Here, we review an emerging research focus that has begun to reunite these approaches, by putting several long-standing philosophical questions to empirical test. Unlike more general sources of philosophical inspiration, the work described here draws a direct line from a prominent philosophical conjecture or thought experiment about perception to a key test of that question in the laboratory—such that the relevant experimental work would not (and even could not) have proceeded as it did without the preceding philosophical discussion. Finally, we explore themes arising from these successful interactions, and point to further philosophical questions that might be amenable to empirical approaches.