We present the case for a role of biologically plausible neural network modeling in bridging the gap between physiology and behavior. We argue that spiking-level networks can allow "vertical" translation between physiological properties of neural systems and emergent "whole-system" performanceenabling psychological results to be simulated from implemented networks and also inferences to be made from simulations concerning processing at a neural level. These models also emphasize particular factors (e.g., the dynamics of performance in relation to real-time neuronal processing) that are not highlighted in other approaches and that can be tested empirically. We illustrate our argument from neural-level models that select stimuli by biased competition. We show that a model with biased competition dynamics can simulate data ranging from physiological studies of single-cell activity (Study 1) to whole-system behavior in human visual search (Study 2), while also capturing effects at an intermediate level, including performance breakdown after neural lesion (Study 3) and data from brain imaging (Study 4). We also show that, at each level of analysis, novel predictions can be derived from the biologically plausible parameters adopted, which we proceed to test (Study 5). We argue that, at least for studying the dynamics of visual attention, the approach productively links single-cell to psychological data.
Keywords: visual search, integrate-and-fire neurons, computational model, fMRI, neuropsychologyUnderstanding human cognition is difficult. One of the difficulties is that cognition can be described at many different levelsfrom the high-level computational principles that may shape the landscape within which processes must function, through to the physiological principles by which neurons operate. How can these different levels best be related? Marr (1982) provided an influential framework in which different levels of analysis were described. This framework separated out, on the one hand, theories dealing with the computational principles and the neural hardware, from, on the other, "midlevel" theories that deal with abstract algorithms, which could operate on a variety of platforms (computers as well as human brains). However, what was not specified in this framework was how we move between the different levels; indeed, the levels were described as operating in a quasi-independent manner. This means that, within the framework, it is possible to have an algorithmic account of cognition that is separated from constraints based on neural-level functions, as well as neural-level accounts unconstrained by data derived from the operation of component cognitive processes. This leaves unspecified how we may link theories dealing with abstract psychological mechanisms (attention, memory, decision making) to theories that are concerned with how neurons communicate. It also means that the benefits that might be gained from this linkage are unexploited; theoretical insights at one level do not infiltrate other levels. The aim of t...