Speaking from other demonic bases of partiality

Abstract

As Simandan (2019) argues, partiality and contingency are key to a politically attuned human geography. My commentary takes the author up on his suggestion that commentators examine the political implications of his framework. Critically, I use Sylvia Wynter’s analytic of ‘demonic ground’ to critique Simandan’s ‘demonic geography’ that underlies the epistemic framework he presents in this article. In doing so, this commentary focuses on the author’s conceptualization of intersectionality and diversity, arguing instead for a more fundamental critique of the geopolitical location of post-humanist thought itself.

Beyond Haraway? Addressing constructive criticisms to the ‘four epistemic gaps’ interpretation of positionality and situated knowledges

“…Sneha Krishnan’s (2019) commentary is the only one that contextualizes the anchor article against the background of my prior related work (cf. Simandan, 2002).…”

“…Specifically, she engages in a constructive spirit the anti-humanist ontology of the human developed under the banner of ‘demonic geography’ (Simandan, 2017) by noticing its centrality to understanding the anchor article and by cross-fertilizing it with Sylvia Wynter’s related trope of ‘demonic ground’. This striking articulation, she argues, has the potential to develop the political implications of my framework by enabling a ‘fundamental critique of the geopolitical location of post-humanist thought itself’ (Krishnan, 2019: 154). Whereas she notes that ‘an explicitly disenchanted view of the human is central to Simandan’s discussion of cognition and perception’ (Krishnan, 2019: 156), I would point out that there is forthcoming work where I explore new ways of finding enchantment that do not presuppose the humanist baggage (Simandan, 2018a).…”

“…This striking articulation, she argues, has the potential to develop the political implications of my framework by enabling a ‘fundamental critique of the geopolitical location of post-humanist thought itself’ (Krishnan, 2019: 154). Whereas she notes that ‘an explicitly disenchanted view of the human is central to Simandan’s discussion of cognition and perception’ (Krishnan, 2019: 156), I would point out that there is forthcoming work where I explore new ways of finding enchantment that do not presuppose the humanist baggage (Simandan, 2018a). Krishnan problematizes social difference by suggesting that ‘race and gender are…not so much positional locations that might shape perception…but fundamentally shape the terms on which perception is made possible and socio-politically legible’ (Krishnan, 2019: 156).…”

“…Whereas she notes that ‘an explicitly disenchanted view of the human is central to Simandan’s discussion of cognition and perception’ (Krishnan, 2019: 156), I would point out that there is forthcoming work where I explore new ways of finding enchantment that do not presuppose the humanist baggage (Simandan, 2018a). Krishnan problematizes social difference by suggesting that ‘race and gender are…not so much positional locations that might shape perception…but fundamentally shape the terms on which perception is made possible and socio-politically legible’ (Krishnan, 2019: 156). This problematization echoes both the anchor article’s revisiting of situated knowledges in ways that go beyond ‘simply social difference’ (Simandan, 2019a: 131) and recent articulations of Deleuzian and feminist ontologies of difference in the work of Cockayne et al (2017) and Kinkaid (2019).…”

“…The same attitude to the anchor article’s (excessive) focus on Haraway underpins Krishnan’s commentary. She argues that ‘while Simandan’s framework of epistemic gaps proposes an important pragmatic way of operationalizing Haraway’s concept of partiality, its conception of partiality and diversity do[es] not engage…the work of Black feminist scholars’ (Krishnan, 2019: 156). Once again, I am grateful to both JP Catungal and Sneha Krishnan for highlighting this issue (although see the brief discussion of Black feminist theory in the context of intersectionality on page X of the anchor article) and for showing in their respective commentaries how the ‘four epistemic gaps’ model can be enriched through a deeper engagement with Black and Chicanx feminist theory.…”