Speaking Out of Both Sides of Their Mouths

Crawford, Jarret T.; Kay, Sophie A.; Duke, Kristen

doi:10.1177/1948550614566858

Cited by 33 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 39 publications

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“…Participants rated their personal political orientation on a nine-point, vertical scale from (1) extremely conservative to (9) extremely liberal, with moderate as the mid-point (5) as was used in Jost et al, 2007. The political orientation item has often been included within demographics in previous research (Fitzgerald and Wickwire, 2012; Feinberg and Willer, 2013; Crawford et al, 2015; Janoff-Bulman and Carnes, 2016). The mean political orientation score was 5.65 ( SD = 2.17).…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Bridging Political Divides: Perceived Threat and Uncertainty Avoidance Help Explain the Relationship Between Political Ideology and Immigrant Attitudes Within Diverse Intergroup Contexts

2019

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The political divide between liberals and conservatives has become quite large and stable, and there appear to be many reasons for disagreements on a wide range of issues. The current research sought to explain these divides and to extend the Uncertainty-Threat Model to intergroup relations, which predicts that more dispositional, perceived-threat and uncertainty-avoidance will be related to more political conservatism. Given that conservatism is also often related to more negativity to low-status groups such as immigrants, the relationship between political ideology and negative attitudes toward immigrants may be mediated by more threat and uncertainty-avoidance. Study 1 tested this mediational hypothesis in a correlational design and showed that both uncertainty-avoidance and perceived realistic and symbolic threat significantly mediated the relationship between political ideology and attitudes toward immigrants, and that perceived threat was the more influential mediator. Study 2 extended threat management to perceived threats from unspecified outgroups, as opposed to the immigrant outgroup, and it replicated all significant mediations. Study 3 replicated the mediations observed in Studies 1 and 2 for political ideology to attitudes toward immigrants with uncertainty-avoidance and perceived threat from immigrants as mediators; it further replicated the mediations to the negative attitudes measure that had been used in Study 2 and it extended it to an objective and indirect bias measure [i.e., Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP)]. Overall, almost all of the results supported the idea that perceived threat and uncertainty-avoidance both mediate the relationship between political ideology and attitudes toward immigrants, and that threat management, as opposed to negativity bias, may be a central concern separating liberals and conservatives. Within all three studies, we also observed more evidence for the Uncertainty-Threat Model predictions than we did for the alternative Extremity Hypothesis, which predicted a quadratic relationship between political ideology and threat and uncertainty, and between political ideology and attitudes toward immigrants.

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Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Bridging Political Divides: Perceived Threat and Uncertainty Avoidance Help Explain the Relationship Between Political Ideology and Immigrant Attitudes Within Diverse Intergroup Contexts

2019

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“…It is challenging to measure bias in a within-subjects design. People feel compelled to maintain consistency in their judgments, and insofar as they are reluctant to answer the same question in different ways, the design may preclude finding differences (see Uhlmann et al, 2009; Crawford et al, 2015; Winegard et al, 2018). Nonetheless, evidence of motivated change in judgments would contribute to the case that people furnish responses to free will questions partly to uphold moral responsibility.…”

Section: Studymentioning

confidence: 99%

Forget the Folk: Moral Responsibility Preservation Motives and Other Conditions for Compatibilism

2019

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For years, experimental philosophers have attempted to discern whether laypeople find free will compatible with a scientifically deterministic understanding of the universe, yet no consensus has emerged. The present work provides one potential explanation for these discrepant findings: People are strongly motivated to preserve free will and moral responsibility, and thus do not have stable, logically rigorous notions of free will. Seven studies support this hypothesis by demonstrating that a variety of logically irrelevant (but motivationally relevant) features influence compatibilist judgments. In Study 1, participants who were asked to consider the possibility that our universe is deterministic were more compatibilist than those not asked to consider this possibility, suggesting that determinism poses a threat to moral responsibility, which increases compatibilist responding (thus reducing the threat). In Study 2, participants who considered concrete instances of moral behavior found compatibilist free will more sufficient for moral responsibility than participants who were asked about moral responsibility more generally. In Study 3a, the order in which participants read free will and determinism descriptions influenced their compatibilist judgments–and only when the descriptions had moral significance: Participants were more likely to report that determinism was compatible with free will than that free will was compatible with determinism. In Study 3b, participants who read the free will description first (the more compatibilist group) were particularly likely to confess that their beliefs in free will and moral responsibility and their disbelief in determinism influenced their conclusion. In Study 4, participants reduced their compatibilist beliefs after reading a passage that argued that moral responsibility could be preserved even in the absence of free will. Participants also reported that immaterial souls were compatible with scientific determinism, most strongly among immaterial soul believers (Study 5), and evaluated information about the capacities of primates in a biased manner favoring the existence of human free will (Study 6). These results suggest that people do not have one intuition about whether free will is compatible with determinism. Instead, people report that free will is compatible with determinism when desiring to uphold moral responsibility. Recommendations for future work are discussed.

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“…For example, recent work using behavioural rather than self-report measures has found that cognitive flexibility is reduced in strong partisans on both sides of the political spectrum (Zmigrod et al, 2019). In this study, while social conservatism also predicted cognitive rigidity, this factor was much less influential than partisan extremity (also see Crawford, Kay, & Duke, 2015). Ryan and Aziz (2020) reported an experiment in which Democrats and Republicans were equally likely to endorse misleading rumours about political opponents.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 61%

Corrections of Political Misinformation: No Evidence for an Effect of Partisan Worldview in a U.S. Convenience Sample

Ecker¹,

Sze²,

Andreotta³

2020

Preprint

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Misinformation often has a continuing effect on people’s reasoning despite clear correction. One factor assumed to affect post-correction reliance on misinformation is worldview-driven motivated reasoning. For example, a recent study with an Australian undergraduate sample found that when politically-situated misinformation was retracted, political partisanship influenced the effectiveness of the retraction. This worldview effect was asymmetrical, that is, particularly pronounced in politically-conservative participants. However, the evidence regarding such worldview effects (and their symmetry) has been inconsistent. Thus, the present study aimed to extend previous findings by examining a sample of 429 pre-screened U.S. participants supporting either the Democratic or Republican Party. Participants received misinformation suggesting that politicians of either party were more likely to commit embezzlement; this was or was not subsequently retracted, and participants’ inferential reasoning was measured. While political worldview (i.e., partisanship) influenced the extent to which participants relied on the misinformation overall, retractions were equally effective across all conditions. There was no impact of political worldview on retraction effectiveness, let alone evidence of a backfire effect, and thus we did not replicate the asymmetry observed in the Australian-based study. This pattern emerged despite some evidence that Republicans showed a stronger emotional response than Democrats to worldview-incongruent misinformation.

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Speaking Out of Both Sides of Their Mouths

Cited by 33 publications

References 39 publications

Bridging Political Divides: Perceived Threat and Uncertainty Avoidance Help Explain the Relationship Between Political Ideology and Immigrant Attitudes Within Diverse Intergroup Contexts

Bridging Political Divides: Perceived Threat and Uncertainty Avoidance Help Explain the Relationship Between Political Ideology and Immigrant Attitudes Within Diverse Intergroup Contexts

Forget the Folk: Moral Responsibility Preservation Motives and Other Conditions for Compatibilism

Corrections of Political Misinformation: No Evidence for an Effect of Partisan Worldview in a U.S. Convenience Sample

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