As a multilevel and multidisciplinary field, neuroscience is designed to interact with various branches of natural and applied sciences as well as with humanities and philosophy. The continental tradition in philosophy, particularly over the past 20 years, tended to establish strong connections with biology and neuroscience findings. This cross fertilization can however be impeded by conceptual intricacies, such as those surrounding the concept of plasticity. The use of this concept has broadened as scientists applied it to explore an ever‐growing range of biological phenomena. Here, we examine the consequences of this ambiguity in an interdisciplinary context through the analysis of the concept of “destructive plasticity” in the philosophical writings of Catherine Malabou. The term “destructive plasticity” was coined by Malabou in 2009 to refer to all processes leading to psycho‐cognitive and emotional alterations following traumatic or nontraumatic brain injuries or resulting from neurodevelopmental disorders. By comparing it with the neuroscientific definitions of plasticity, we discuss the epistemological obstacles and possibilities related to the integration of this concept into neuroscience. Improving interdisciplinary exchanges requires an advanced and sophisticated manipulation of neurobiological concepts. These concepts are not only intended to guide research programmes within neuroscience but also to organize and frame the dialogue between different theoretical backgrounds.