Spectrum pricing games with arbitrary bandwidth availability probabilities

Kasbekar, Gaurav S.; Sarkar, Saswati

doi:10.1109/isit.2011.6034065

Cited by 17 publications

(36 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…where (33) follows from (32) similar to the derivation of (22). Thus, primaries do not play prices belowp in the NE and henceφ N E (p) = 0.…”

Section: By (27) and Lemma 4)mentioning

confidence: 95%

“…The closest to our work are [8], [9], which analyze price competition where each seller may be inactive with some probability, as also our prior work [21], [22], [23] in which we analyzed price competition in a CRN. However, the results in [8], [9] are restricted to the case of one buyer, those in [22] to the case of a constant and known number of secondaries and in [22], [23] and for the most part in [21], it is assumed that the valuations of all the secondaries are constant and equal and known to the primaries.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, the results in [8], [9] are restricted to the case of one buyer, those in [22] to the case of a constant and known number of secondaries and in [22], [23] and for the most part in [21], it is assumed that the valuations of all the secondaries are constant and equal and known to the primaries. In [8], [9], [21], the case in which the valuation is a random variable is considered only for the case of a single buyer and under some restrictive assumptions on the distribution function of its valuation.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Spectrum pricing games with random valuations of secondary users

Kasbekar

Sarkar

2012

2012 46th Annual Conference on Information Sciences and Systems (CISS)

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Abstract-We analyze price competition among primary users in a Cognitive Radio Network (CRN), in which there are a random and unknown number of secondary users. In every slot, each primary has unused bandwidth with some probability, which it would like to lease to a secondary user, and must set a price for this bandwidth. The valuations of the secondary users for unit bandwidth are independent and identically distributed random variables. We analyze this price competition as a game and explicitly compute a Nash Equilibrium (NE), which we show to be unique in the class of symmetric NE. We show that randomness in the valuations of the secondary users results in significant structural differences in the strategies of the primaries in the NE compared to the case in which the valuations of the secondaries are constants.

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“…where (33) follows from (32) similar to the derivation of (22). Thus, primaries do not play prices belowp in the NE and henceφ N E (p) = 0.…”

Section: By (27) and Lemma 4)mentioning

confidence: 95%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Spectrum pricing games with random valuations of secondary users

Kasbekar

Sarkar

2012

2012 46th Annual Conference on Information Sciences and Systems (CISS)

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“…For instance, the work in [22] analyzes the outcome of a game-theoretic pricing competition between providers in private commons. In the works by Jagannathan et al [23], Kasbekar and Sarkar [24], Duan et al [25], Niyato and Hossain [26], Sengupta and Chatterjee [27] and Xing et al [28], game theoretic approaches to spectrum auctioning and leasing are analyzed. None of the previous work surveyed here considers the impact of spectrum reservation for smaller providers on the competitiveness of a wireless market.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Network dimensioning with carrier aggregation

Kavurmacioglu

Starobinski

2015

2015 IEEE International Symposium on Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks (DySPAN)

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Abstract-A recent policy ruling by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) set aside a fixed amount of cleared spectrum for smaller network providers. Thanks to this ruling, smaller providers can improve their quality of service using carrier aggregation. In this paper, we determine the optimal (minimum) level of carrier aggregation that a smaller provider needs in order to bring its service in line with a larger provider in the same market. Toward this end, we provide an asymptotically exact formula for the loss (blocking) probability of flows under a quality-driven (QD) regime. Using this formula, we establish an efficient way of numerically calculating the optimal level of carrier aggregation and derive scaling laws. Specifically, we show that the optimal level of carrier aggregation scales sub-linearly with respect to the scaling factor, i.e., the ratio between the network capacities of the two providers, and decreases with the initial traffic load of the providers. We derive a closed-form linear upper bound on the optimal level of carrier aggregation and prove that it is the tightest possible. We provide numerical results, showing the accuracy of our methods and illustrating their use. We also discuss the extension of our results to delayrelated metrics as well as their application to profitable pricing in secondary spectrum markets.

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“…The closest to our work are [10], [11], which analyze price competition where each seller may be inactive with some probability, as also our prior work [20], [21], [22], [23], [24] in which we analyzed price competition in a CRN. However, all of the above papers assume that the bandwidth (commodity) availabilities and demands of different sellers and buyers are mutually independent.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Spectrum pricing games with correlated bandwidth availabilities and demands

Kasbekar

Sarkar

2014

2014 Information Theory and Applications Workshop (ITA)

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Abstract-We study price competition among primaries in a Cognitive Radio Network (CRN) with multiple primaries and secondaries located in a large region. In a given slot, some of the primaries have unused bandwidth, which they can potentially lease out to secondaries in exchange for a fee. There is uncertainty in whether a given primary has unused bandwidth in a given slot as well as in the number of secondaries that require bandwidth, with the above random quantities being mutually correlated. Each primary tries to attract secondaries by setting a lower price for its bandwidth than the other primaries. Radio spectrum has the distinctive feature that transmissions at neighboring locations on the same channel interfere with each other, whereas the same channel can be used at far-off locations without mutual interference. So in the above price competition scenario, each primary must jointly select a set of mutually non-interfering locations within the region (which corresponds to an independent set in the conflict graph representing the region) at which to offer bandwidth and the price at each location. In this paper, we analyze this price competition scenario as a game and seek a Nash Equilibrium (NE). We analyze the game at a single location as well as the game at multiple locations. We characterize NE for the cases of (i) symmetric bandwidth availability events of different primaries and (ii) asymmetric bandwidth availability events with a special correlation structure.

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Spectrum pricing games with arbitrary bandwidth availability probabilities

Cited by 17 publications

References 18 publications

Spectrum pricing games with random valuations of secondary users

Spectrum pricing games with random valuations of secondary users

Network dimensioning with carrier aggregation

Spectrum pricing games with correlated bandwidth availabilities and demands

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