Spectrum Sharing in Cognitive Radio Networks

Krunz, Marwan; Cui, Siwei

doi:10.1109/infocom.2007.252

Cited by 25 publications

(32 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…In [15], an integrated pricing, allocating, and billing system was proposed for cognitive radio networks. In [16], a joint power/channel allocation scheme was proposed that used a distributed pricing strategy to improve the network's performance. In [17], a non-cooperative game based pricing scheme was proposed for uplink power control in cognitive radio networks.…”

Section: B Spectrum Trading In Cognitive Radio Networkmentioning

confidence: 99%

Spectrum Trading in Cognitive Radio Networks: A Contract-Theoretic Modeling Approach

Gao

Wang

et al. 2011

IEEE J. Select. Areas Commun.

395

209

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Abstract-Cognitive radio is a promising paradigm to achieve efficient utilization of spectrum resource by allowing the unlicensed users (i.e., secondary users, SUs) to access the licensed spectrum. Market-driven spectrum trading is an efficient way to achieve dynamic spectrum accessing/sharing. In this paper, we consider the problem of spectrum trading with single primary spectrum owner (or primary user, PO) selling his idle spectrum to multiple SUs. We model the trading process as a monopoly market, in which the PO acts as monopolist who sets the qualities and prices for the spectrum he sells, and the SUs act as consumers who choose the spectrum with appropriate quality and price for purchasing. We design a monopolist-dominated quality-price contract, which is offered by the PO and contains a set of qualityprice combinations each intended for a consumer type. A contract is feasible if it is incentive compatible (IC) and individually rational (IR) for each SU to purchase the spectrum with the quality-price intended for his type. We propose the necessary and sufficient conditions for the contract to be feasible. We further derive the optimal contract, which is feasible and maximizes the utility of the PO, for both discrete-consumer-type model and continuous-consumer-type model. Moreover, we analyze the social surplus, i.e., the aggregate utility of both PO and SUs, and we find that, depending on the distribution of consumer types, the social surplus under the optimal contract may be less than or close to the maximum social surplus.

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Section: B Spectrum Trading In Cognitive Radio Networkmentioning

confidence: 99%

Spectrum Trading in Cognitive Radio Networks: A Contract-Theoretic Modeling Approach

Gao

Wang

et al. 2011

IEEE J. Select. Areas Commun.

395

209

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Wang et al [21] proposed a novel joint power/channel allocation scheme to improve the network's performance by modeling the spectrum allocation problem as a noncooperative game among the CR users. Etkin et al suggested a repeated game approach to enforce an efficient and fair outcome and incentive compatible spectrum sharing [10].…”

Section: A Backgroundmentioning

confidence: 99%

Auction mechanism for spectrum allocation and profit sharing

Chun

2009

2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks

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Abstract-We examine the problem of designing an auction mechanism for dynamic spectrum sharing when there are multiple sellers and multiple buyers. First, we study the interaction among homogeneous buyers of spectrum as a noncooperative game and show the existence of a symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (SMSNE). Second, we prove that there exists an incentive for risk neutral sellers of the spectrum to cooperate to maximize their expected profits at the SMSNEs of buyers' noncooperative game. Finally, we model the interaction among the sellers as a cooperative game and demonstrate that the core of the cooperative game is nonempty. This indicates that there exists a way for the sellers to share the profits in a such manner that no subset of sellers will deviate from cooperating with the remaining sellers.

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“…Spectrum decision refers to the process of deciding in which holes to allocate communications (Akyildiz et al, 2008). The spectrum sharing function consists on maximizing the Cognitive Radio Users (CRUs) performance without disturbing Primary Users (PUs) and other CRUs (Akyildiz et al, 2008;Wang et al, 2008). In our work, we consider the spectrum decision and spectrum sharing as parts of an entity called spectrum access.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%