Existing academic research on vibration-based speech attacks has introduced interesting and intellectually appealing threat vectors with proof-of-concept demonstrations in controlled environments. The attacks presented in these studies exploit different types of sensors such as MEMS motion sensors, laser-based sensors, and some other sensors (camera, position error signal, piezo-disc) to measure the vibrations induced on an object by nearby sensitive speech. Such sensors are commonly found on mobile devices like smartphones and tablets that can be exposed to sensitive speech, revealing the significance of this potential threat. These studies have amassed significant attention in news and media and introduced concern to people about the safety of their day-to-day speech and around their personal, wireless and IoT devices. However, we hypothesize that the controlled experiments in the prior research maintain critical parameter values that are favorable to attack success (deviating from the limiting settings in a real-world scenario) and produce results that suggest a greater real-life threat level than actually exists.The contributions made in this paper are as follows; First, we provide a detailed review of 10 existing academic research works related to vibration-based eavesdropping attacks. Second, we identify key experimental parameters that can impact the success of eavesdropping in the vibration domain. Third, we build a framework to evaluate the existing literature based on the Percent Parameters in Favored Settings (PPFS) Score metric that we define. Lastly, we use our defined framework to evaluate the feasibility of the existing vibration-based speech attacks to compromise live human speech to the extent of full speech recognition. The results of our evaluation suggest that none of the existing vibration-based eavesdropping attacks have a high likelihood of successfully compromising live human speech in a real-world scenario.