2009
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-02085-8_1
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Speed Dating Despite Jammers

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Cited by 34 publications
(21 citation statements)
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“…Gilbert et al [23] derive bounds on the time required for information exchange when a reactive adversary jams multiple channels. Meier et al [44] examine the delay introduced by a jamming adversary for the problem of node discovery, again in a multi-channel setting. Dolev et al [19] address secure communication using multiple channels with a non-reactive adversary.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Gilbert et al [23] derive bounds on the time required for information exchange when a reactive adversary jams multiple channels. Meier et al [44] examine the delay introduced by a jamming adversary for the problem of node discovery, again in a multi-channel setting. Dolev et al [19] address secure communication using multiple channels with a non-reactive adversary.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…They also study a setting allowing the nodes to exchange authenticated messages despite a malicious adversary that can cause collisions and spoof messages [10], and present new bounds on broadcasting [11]. Another line of work focuses on the bootstrap problem where nodes have to find each other despite adversarial jammers [23,8,4]. Awerbuch et al [3] present a MAC protocol for single-hop networks that is provably robust to an adaptive adversary that can jam (in a blocking style) a (1 − )-fraction of the rounds.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…[1,11,16,17]), or bounds the number of channels the adversary can jam (e.g. [8,9,10,19]). The protocols in, e.g., [17] can tackle adversarial jamming at both the MAC and network layers, where the adversary may not only jam the channel but also introduce malicious (fake) messages (possibly with address spoofing).…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%