Imagine that Alice wants to send a message to Bob, and that Carol wants to prevent this. Assume there is a communication channel between Alice and Bob, but that Carol is capable of blocking this channel. Furthermore, there is a cost of S dollars to send on the channel, L dollars to listen on the channel and J to block the channel. How much will Alice and Bob need to spend in order to guarantee transmission of the message?This problem abstracts many types of conflict in information networks including: jamming attacks in wireless networks and distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks on the Internet, where the costs to Alice, Bob and Carol represent an expenditure of energy and network resources. The problem allows us to quantitatively analyze the economics of information exchange in an adversarial setting and ask: Is communication cheaper than censorship?We answer this question in the affirmative by showing that it is significantly more costly for Carol to block communication of the message than for Alice to communicate it to Bob. Specifically, if S, L and J are fixed constants, and Carol spends a total of B dollars to try to block the message, then Alice and Bob must spend only O(B ϕ−1 +1) = O(B .62 +1) dollars in expectation to transmit the message, where ϕ = (1 + √ 5)/2 is the golden ratio. Surprisingly, this result holds even if (1) the value of B is unknown to both Alice and Bob; (2) Carol knows the algorithms of both Alice and Bob, but not their random bits; and (3) Carol is adaptive: able to launch attacks using total knowledge of past actions of both players.Finally, we apply our work to two concrete problems: (1) denial-of-service attacks in wireless sensor networks and (2) application-level distributed denial-of-service attacks in a wired client-server scenarios. Our applications show how our results can provide an additional tool in mitigating such attacks.