2016
DOI: 10.1515/tmmp-2016-0030
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Speed Optimizations in Bitcoin Key Recovery Attacks

Abstract: ABSTRACT. In this paper, we study and give the first detailed benchmarks on existing implementations of the secp256k1 elliptic curve used by at least hundreds of thousands of users in Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies. Our implementation improves the state of the art by a factor of 2.5 with a focus on the cases, where side channel attacks are not a concern and a large quantity of RAM is available. As a result, we are able to scan the Bitcoin blockchain for weak keys faster than any previous implementation. We… Show more

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Cited by 18 publications
(19 citation statements)
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“…Yet the fact is that it is redundant to record the public key itself on the blockchain as ECDSA facilitates public key recovery given the signature, plain text message and nonce used, which suggests the designer(s) were not fully conversant with elliptic curve cryptography at the outset. An interesting aside is the ECDSA signature nonce must be truly random for any address re-use as private key recovery is possible given known public keys, signatures, corresponding plain texts and nonces [ 15 ]. Once linkability is established between a user's transactions through means such as those exhibited throughout this article, patterns of ECDSA nonce use may expose a feasible attack vector.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Yet the fact is that it is redundant to record the public key itself on the blockchain as ECDSA facilitates public key recovery given the signature, plain text message and nonce used, which suggests the designer(s) were not fully conversant with elliptic curve cryptography at the outset. An interesting aside is the ECDSA signature nonce must be truly random for any address re-use as private key recovery is possible given known public keys, signatures, corresponding plain texts and nonces [ 15 ]. Once linkability is established between a user's transactions through means such as those exhibited throughout this article, patterns of ECDSA nonce use may expose a feasible attack vector.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…A first standard of current applications and quick execution of different applications with larger RAM is provided [14].…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Self-sovereign (i.e., non-custodial) wallets do not pose a single point of failure in contrast to server-side (i.e., custodial) wallets, which when compromised, resulted in huge financial loses [2,9,53,68,77]. Security: the insufficient security level of some self-sovereign wallets has caused significant financial losses for individuals and companies [16,18,26,60]. We argue that wallets should be designed with security in mind and in particular, we point out 2FA solutions, which have successfully contributed to the security of other environments [3,69].…”
Section: Problem Definitionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…These private keys are managed by a wallet software that gives users an interface to interact with the cryptocurrency. There are many cases of stolen keys that were secured by various means [9,16,18,26]. Such cases have brought the attention of the research community to the security issues related to key management in cryptocurrencies [14,32,34].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
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