Spinoza’s Monism I: Ruling Out Eternal-Durational Causation

Abstract

In this essay, I suggest that Spinoza acknowledges a distinction between formal reality that is infinite and timelessly eternal and formal reality that is non-infinite (i. e., finite or indefinite) and non-eternal (i. e., enduring). I also argue that if, in Spinoza’s system, only intelligible causation is genuine causation, then infinite, timelessly eternal formal reality cannot cause non-infinite, non-eternal formal reality. A denial of eternal-durational causation generates a puzzle, however: if no enduring thing – not even the sempiternal, indefinite individual composed of all finite, enduring things – is caused by the infinite, eternal substance, then how can Spinoza consistently hold that the one infinite, eternal substance is the cause of all things and that all things are modes of that substance? At the end of this essay, I sketch how Spinoza could deny eternal-durational causation while still holding that an infinite, eternal God is the cause of all things and that all things are modes. I develop the interpretation more in the companion essay.1 1 In “Spinoza’s Monism II,” in the next issue of this journal.

A Perspectival Reading of Spinoza's Essence-Existence Distinction

“…My critique of causal dualism ties in perfectly with their analysis. Against a long tradition of interpretation, Kristin Primus argues that E1P21-23 does not describe the causation of one special class of modes (the so-called "infinite modes") but describes the causation of all modes (Primus, 2019(Primus, , 2021a(Primus, , 2021b. What Spinoza argues for in these propositions is that each and every mode of God's infinite attributes is itself infinite and eternal.…”

“… 5 For example, Noa Shein (2018, 2020) argues that all modes have both an infinite and finite aspect. Kristin Primus (2019, 2021a, 2021b) argues that all modes are actually infinite modes and that they are only inadequately understood as finite. Lastly, Raphael Krut-Landau (2021) argues that eternity and duration (and the transition from one to the other) constitute three perspectives on nature.…”

Part V of Spinoza's Ethics: Intuitive knowledge, contentment of mind, and intellectual love of God

“…In the second half of Part II, Spinoza presents inadequate ideas as confused and adequate ideas as clear and distinct (see, e.g., E2p28, E2p35, E2p36). Spinoza argues that every idea that is adequate in the human mind is true in E2p34.11See Carriero (2020) andPrimus (2021).12 Cf. The Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect § §18-30 (G II.10-13) and the Short Treatise Part II, chs.…”