2017
DOI: 10.1007/s11097-017-9550-y
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Split-brain syndrome and extended perceptual consciousness

Abstract: In this paper I argue that split-brain syndrome is best understood within an extended mind framework and, therefore, that its very existence provides support for an externalist account of conscious perception. I begin by outlining the experimental aberration model of split-brain syndrome and explain both: why this model provides the best account of split-brain syndrome; and, why it is commonly rejected. Then, I summarise Susan Hurley's argument that splitbrain subjects could unify their conscious perceptual fi… Show more

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Cited by 7 publications
(1 citation statement)
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“…As noted by Bayne (2005) and Downey (2018), what seems to be required by a splitting‐and‐merging view is a version of what Susan Hurley (1998) called “vehicle externalism,” the idea that part of the material basis for a mind can be external to the body. Then the everyday situation can involve something tighter than cooperation between two minds.…”
Section: The Human Split‐brain Conditionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…As noted by Bayne (2005) and Downey (2018), what seems to be required by a splitting‐and‐merging view is a version of what Susan Hurley (1998) called “vehicle externalism,” the idea that part of the material basis for a mind can be external to the body. Then the everyday situation can involve something tighter than cooperation between two minds.…”
Section: The Human Split‐brain Conditionmentioning
confidence: 99%