Split‐brains and Singular Personhood

Greenwood, John D.

doi:10.1111/j.2041-6962.1993.tb01722.x

Cited by 3 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…13. Broad (1925) and Greenwood (1993) seem to endorse this account of inter-alter access as well. 14.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 98%

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The inclusion model of the Incarnation: problems and prospects

Bayne

2001

Rel. Stud.

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Thomas Morris and Richard Swinburne have recently defended what they call the ' two-minds ' model of the Incarnation. This model, which I refer to as the ' inclusion model ' or ' inclusionism ', claims that Christ had two consciousnesses, a human and a divine consciousness, with the former consciousness contained within the latter one. I begin by exploring the motivation for, and structure of, inclusionism. I then develop a variety of objections to it : some philosophical, others theological in nature. Finally, I sketch a variant of inclusionism which I call ' restricted inclusionism ' (RI) ; RI can evade many, but not all, of the objections to standard inclusionism.

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“…13. Broad (1925) and Greenwood (1993) seem to endorse this account of inter-alter access as well. 14.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 98%

“…Much of the commissurotomy literature has assumed that two streams of consciousness entails two subjects of experience. Moor (1981), Greenwood (1993), andvan Inwagen (1990) are among the few who reject this assumption.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The inclusion model of the Incarnation: problems and prospects

Bayne

2001

Rel. Stud.

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“…Indeed, a natural reading of the traditional claim that consciousness is uni®ed is that a self can only have a single stream of consciousness at any one time (Bayne & Chalmers, 2002). Even those who reject the claim that consciousness is necessarily uni®ed in this sense grant that consciousness is normally uni®ed (Davis, 1997;Greenwood, 1993;Marks, 1980;Moor, 1982). Prolonged bifurcation in consciousness, it is generally thought, would lead to the development of multiple selves.…”

Section: The Selfmentioning

confidence: 95%

Moral Status and the Treatment of Dissociative Identity Disorder1

Bayne

2002

The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy

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Many contemporary bioethicists claim that the possession of certain psychological properties is sufficient for having full moral status. I will call this the psychological approach to full moral status. In this paper, I argue that there is a significant tension between the psychological approach and a widely held model of Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID, formerly Multiple Personality Disorder). According to this model, the individual personalities or alters that belong to someone with DID possess those properties that proponents of the psychological approach claim suffice for full moral status. If this account of DID is true, then the psychological approach to full moral status seems to entail that the two standard therapies for treating DID might, on occasion, be seriously immoral, for they may well involve the (involuntary) elimination of an entity with full moral status. This result should give proponents of the psychological approach pause, for most people find the claim that current treatments of DID are ethically suspect highly counter-intuitive.

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A Sense of Identity: Prolegomena to a Social Theory of Personal Identity

Greenwood

1994

J Theory Soc Behav

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A philosophical account of personal identity -in terms of the maintenance offundamental belie&, principles and commitments by spatiotemporally continuous particulars -is sketched, an account which is able to incorporate a social and relational conception of personal identity, and thus serve as the basis for a social psychological theory of personal identity -in terms of the pursuit of'identity projects' within social collectives. Some implications of this theory are developed, concerning the relation between identity and individualism, responsibility and social labeling. The theory develops an account of the social constitution of personal identity that is consistent with a realist conception ofsocial psychological theories of identity: as objective theoretical descriptions of the social dimensions of identity.

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Split‐brains and Singular Personhood

Cited by 3 publications

References 16 publications

The inclusion model of the Incarnation: problems and prospects

The inclusion model of the Incarnation: problems and prospects

Moral Status and the Treatment of Dissociative Identity Disorder1

A Sense of Identity: Prolegomena to a Social Theory of Personal Identity

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