Spoofing in civil aviation: Security and safety of GPS/GNSS and ADS-B systems

Abstract

Aircraft systems that rely on satellite positioning technology, such as GNSS and ADS-B, can be the target of a spoofing attack - a sophisticated and very dangerous form of radio frequency interference in which false signals are inserted into the "victim's" receiver for incorrect positioning or timing. Although spoofing in civil aviation is a potential threat, its technical feasibility is realistic, and the application of spoofing is becoming more flexible due to the very rapid progress of cheap SDR platforms. In particular, the potential risk is posed by potential air strikes, using unmanned aerial vehicles/drones, for the purpose of hijacking or distracting security in airspace surveillance. However, aviation is not ruthlessly exposed to spoofing attacks without any defense; by applying certain methods/techniques, spoofing can be mitigated in the GNSS receiver. Also, pilots are trained to detect and solve problems at every stage of the flight. Due to more sophisticated forms of terrorist attacks are possible, international organizations, such as ICAO and EUROCA, are proactively working to increase the robustness of the GNSS and ADS-B systems to spoofing. Given the importance of the topic and the fact that spoofing/antispuffing testing has certain limitations, consideration of the specifics and different scenarios of these attacks are very important in the development of new methods for their mitigation and detection. This paper focuses on spoofing/antispuffing of GNSS and ABS-B systems in civil aviation and provides an overview of the latest research in these areas.