Spousal and survivor benefits in option value models of retirement: an application to Belgium

Abstract

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Retirement Decision of Belgian Couples and the Impact of the Social Security System

“…This result is in line with Knapp (2014), who finds that in response to a decrease in spousal benefits, wives with lower earnings in the household increase their average labor force participation by 1.27 years. Second, similar to Jousten and Lefebvre (2019) who finds that men are less responsive to social security incentives, we do not find a significant change in husbands' retirement behavior. The structure of the social security system creates asymmetric incentives for the primary-earner and the dependent in the household so that for some couples it is more profitable for the dependent to substitute labor income by spousal benefits if s/he does not have access to alternative social security benefits.…”

The expected impact of the 2019 Brazilian pension reform on survivors’ pensions

“…In the international literature, few studies address survivors' pensions: see Myers, Burkhauser and Holden (1987), Turner (1988), andDiebold, Moulton andScott (2017) for the United States of America; Cifre (2013) for Spain; and Jousten and Lefebvre (2019) for Belgium. In Brazil, the literature focused on survivors' pensions is very limited indeed.…”