Squeezed Out? The Liberal Democrats and the 2019 General Election

Abstract

The 2019 general election was a crushing disappointment for the Liberal Democrats, as Jo Swinson lost her East Dunbartonshire seat to the SNP and the party's anti-Brexit stance failed to deliver gains from the Conservatives. Although the Liberal Democrats' poor performance can partly be blamed on a misfiring campaign strategy, it also reflected the structural difficulties which the party faces in an increasingly polarised political environment. The polarisation of public opinion along multiple axes over the last decade-over austerity, Brexit, and attitudes to Jeremy Corbyn-has fractured the broad coalition of support which the Liberal Democrats assembled during the 1990s and 2000s. Analysis of the 2019 results suggest that the party has made some progress towards developing a new core vote, particularly among suburban Remainers in south east England, but it is not clear whether this will be large or robust enough to have a significant impact on the future of British politics.

Who and what is their ‘people’? How British political leaders appealed to the people during the 2019 election

“…As regards the second attitude, it needs to consider separately Swinson's approach, where is difficult to assume that we are facing the populist phenomenon. The inability of the Liberal Democrats to burst through as a real centrist third party (Flinders 2020) can be blamed on poor campaign strategy, although there was a new core vote based on her people, the Remainers, and on the stronger polarization of public opinion for and against Johnson (Sloman 2020).…”

The 2019 European Parliament election in the UK

“…Labour performed poorly compared to 2017, with critics blaming their disassociation from their working-class base and confusion surrounding their message on Brexit (Cutts et al ., 2020). Anticipated gains for the Liberal Democrats also failed to materialise, while the Brexit Party saw its support drain away to the Conservatives, though the party chose not to stand against defending Conservative MPs (Sloman, 2020: 35). Key to the Conservatives' victory was uniting the Leave vote, with three in four Leavers voting Conservative compared to the plurality of Remainers who opted for Labour (Curtice, 2020: 11).…”

“…Correspondingly, the party performed poorly in the West Midlands and eastern England, where support for Brexit was higher (Cutts et al ., 2019: 501). The party's stance on Brexit drew in supporters from both Labour and the Conservatives who were disenchanted by the policies of these parties, which were both officially pro-Brexit and also much more ambiguous (Sloman, 2020: 39). The party also benefited from its pre-existing support in affluent pro-Remain areas, a tradition of strong grass-roots organisation, and by the fact it was no longer associated with the baggage of governing, as it had been in the 2015 general election.…”

“…One discernible finding from the 2017 general election, according to a number of analysts, was a reversal of the trend towards a more diffuse party-system in the UK, given the strong performance of the Conservatives and Labour and the weaker polling of the SNP, UKIP and Liberal Democrats relative to previous elections (Curtice, 2017; Heath and Goodwin, 2017; Johnston et al ., 2018: 179; Prosser, 2018). Yet come the May 2019 European election the Liberal Democrats polled extraordinarily well, as indeed did the Brexit party, and both larger parties lost out, leading to some expectations among politicians that the mainstream parties might not fare as well as in 2019 as they had in 2017 (Sloman, 2020: 40). In line with the expectations of second-order theory, however, the December 2019 results proved a boon for the governing Conservative party, while Labour increased its vote share significantly relative to the May 2019 European Parliament election (though declined relative to the 2017 general election).…”

“… 2 British politics is replete with examples where the Liberal Democrats have been predicted significant – and game-changing gains – only for these to be dashed on election day, with recent examples in 2010, 2017, and 2019 (Parry and Richardson, 2011; Prosser, 2018: 1228; Sloman, 2020). …”