2005
DOI: 10.1016/j.seps.2004.01.001
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Stability of a crime level equilibrium

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Cited by 10 publications
(2 citation statements)
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“…For example, Freedman et al [19] developed a model that depicts that crime is concentrated in places where the possible monetary benefit from committing a crime (the probability of not being convicted due to the reward of the crime) exceeds the cost of criminal opportunity. Wang et al [20] generalized this approach allowing for the cost of an opportunity to be heterogeneous across future criminals and depending on the level of crime in a given society and estimated the amount of group crime activity in equilibrium. Another study focused on sanction policies that reduce crime through general or specific deterrence [21,22].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For example, Freedman et al [19] developed a model that depicts that crime is concentrated in places where the possible monetary benefit from committing a crime (the probability of not being convicted due to the reward of the crime) exceeds the cost of criminal opportunity. Wang et al [20] generalized this approach allowing for the cost of an opportunity to be heterogeneous across future criminals and depending on the level of crime in a given society and estimated the amount of group crime activity in equilibrium. Another study focused on sanction policies that reduce crime through general or specific deterrence [21,22].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For example, Freedman and colleagues [29] developed a model explaining how crime becomes concentrated in certain neighborhoods, where the expected monetary return from committing a crime (the probability of not being arrested times the reward of the crime) exceeds the opportunity costs for crime. Wang et al [30] generalized this approach – by allowing opportunity costs to be heterogeneous across potential criminals and depend on the level of crime in a particular neighborhood – and derived the equilibrium amount of criminal activity in a neighborhood.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%