Stabilization of phenomenon and meaning

Abstract

In recent years, the use of historical cases in philosophy of science has become a proper topic of reflection. In this article I will contribute to his research by means of a discussion of one very famous example of case-based philosophy of science, namely the debate on the London & London model of superconductivity between Cartwright, Suárez and Shomar on the one hand, and French, Ladyman, Bueno and Da Costa on the other. This debate has been going on for years, without any satisfactory resolution. I will argue here that this is because both sides impose on the historical case a particular philosophical conception of scientific representation that does not do justice to the historical facts. Both sides assume, more specifically, that the case concerns the discovery of a representational connection between a given experimental insightthe Meissner effect-and the diamagnetic meaning of London and London's new equations of superconductivity. I will show, however, that at the time of the Londons' publication, neither the experimental insight nor the meaning of the new equations was established: both were open The author would like to acknowledge the Research Foundation-Flanders (FWO) as funding institution.

The tragedy of the canon; or, path dependence in the history and philosophy of science

“…For an illustration of the difficulties this can cause, seePotters (2019).6 This is one illustration. Other cases include, inter alia: Eddington's prediction of starlight bending(Earman and Glymour 1980;Collins and Pinch 1993;Schindler 2013;Kennefick 2019); the debate among HasokChang (2003), KyleStanford (2003), and StathisPsillos (1994) about scientific realism and the caloric theory of heat; and the London brothers' model of superconductivity(Cartwright et al 1994;Bueno et al 2012;Potters 2019). See also the examples inChang (2012).…”