Stable alliance formation in distributional conflict

Garfinkel, Michelle R.

doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2003.06.002

Cited by 71 publications

(54 citation statements)

References 24 publications

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“…Of these, two have been most commonly applied to coalition formation. First, the theory of endogenous coalition formation has been developed in the economics literature (Tullock, 1980;Skaperdas, 1996Skaperdas, , 1998Noh, 2002;Esteban & Sákovics, 2003;Garfinkel, 2004;Bloch et al, 2006;Sánchez-Pagés, 2007;Konrad & Kovenock, 2009;Stamatopoulos et al, 2009;Tan & Wang, 2010). This theory aims to predict coalitionary strategies that maximize individual fitness given a particular (ecological) situation, the costs and benefits of different actions, and the information available to individuals.…”

Section: General Theoretical Perspectivesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Coalitions in theory and reality: a review of pertinent variables and processes

Bissonnette

Perry

Barrett

et al. 2015

Behav

109

104

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Coalitions and alliances are ubiquitous in humans and many other mammals, being part of the fabric of complex social systems. Field biologists and ethologists have accumulated a vast amount of data on coalition and alliance formation, while theoretical biologists have developed modelling approaches. With the accumulation of empirical data and sophisticated theory, we are now potentially able to answer a host of questions about how coalitions emerge and are maintained in a population over time, and how the psychology of this type of cooperation evolved. Progress can only be achieved, however, by effectively bridging the communication gap that currently exists between Coalitions in theory and reality empiricists and theoreticians. In this paper, we aim to do so by asking three questions: (1) What are the primary questions addressed by theoreticians interested in coalition formation, and what are the main building blocks of their models? (2) Do empirical observations support the assumptions of current models, and if not, how can we improve this situation? (3) Has theoretical work led to a better understanding of coalition formation, and what are the most profitable lines of inquiry for the future? Our overarching goal is to promote the integration of theoretical and field biology by motivating empirical scientists to collect data on aspects of coalition formation that are currently poorly quantified and to encourage theoreticians to develop a comprehensive theory of coalition formation that is testable under real-world conditions.

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Section: General Theoretical Perspectivesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Coalitions in theory and reality: a review of pertinent variables and processes

Bissonnette

Perry

Barrett

et al. 2015

Behav

109

104

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Although Manzini and Mariotti refer to alliances, their paper assumes, as ours, a bargaining framework à la Rubinstein and differs therefore from standard literature on alliances (see Sandler and Hartley (2001) for a survey of the economics of alliances and Garfinkel (2004) for a recent development that does not assume that "peace" prevails within the alliance).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Bargaining with Non-Monolithic Players

Péreau

Caparrós²,

Tazdaït

2005

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in .R.S -E.H.E.S.S -CIRED Bargaining with Non-Monolithic Players SummaryThis paper analyses strategic bargaining in negotiations between non-monolithic players, i.e. agents starting negotiations can split up in smaller entities during the bargaining process. We show that the possibility of scission in the informed coalition implies that it loses its information advantages. We also show that when the possibility of a scission exists the uninformed player does not focus on his or her beliefs about the strength of the informed coalition but on the proportion of weak/strong players within this coalition. Finally, our results show that the possibility of a scission reduces the incentives for the leader to propose a high offer to ensure a global agreement. We apply this framework to international negotiations on global public goods and to wage negotiations.

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“…To be more precise, not much attention has been paid to the issues that arise when appropriative activities are carried out by individuals organized into groups. 2 With an aim to start to close the gap, this paper extends the positive analysis of stable group formation in Garfinkel (2004) by considering the role of conflict management within the group. The analysis builds on a simple economic model that features a "winner-take-all" contest for control of some resource.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Hence, relative to the case of individual conflict, the formation of groups can reduce the intensity of conflict, thereby improving overall welfare. 6 Applying the theory of endogenous coalition structures-in the spirit of Bloch (1996), Chwe (1994) and Vohra (1997, 1999), among others- Garfinkel (2004) shows that this effect alone may very well be sufficient to support the stability of group formation in equilibrium. 7 However, the scope for group formation in this context can be limited in the sense that small groups tend to be more stable than large groups.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the Stability of Group Formation: Managing the Conflict Within

Garfinkel

2004

Conflict Management and Peace Science

Self Cite

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Abstract. This paper develops a positive analysis of stable group formation, highlighting the role of conflict management within groups. The analysis builds on a simple economic model that features a "winner-take-all" contest for control of some resource. When a group forms, members pool their efforts in that contest and, if successful, apply the resource to a joint production process. While reducing the severity of conflict over the contestable resource relative to the case of individual conflict, the formation of groups adds another layer of conflict-that is, one between the members of the winning group over the distribution of their joint product. The effectiveness of conflict management in enabling groups to resolve this second layer of conflict in more "peaceful" ways has some important implications for the equilibrium structure of groups as well as for the allocation of resources.

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Stable alliance formation in distributional conflict

Cited by 71 publications

References 24 publications

Coalitions in theory and reality: a review of pertinent variables and processes

Coalitions in theory and reality: a review of pertinent variables and processes

Bargaining with Non-Monolithic Players

On the Stability of Group Formation: Managing the Conflict Within

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