If the laws of nature are as the Humean believes, it is an unexplained cosmic coincidence that the actual Humean mosaic is as extremely regular as it is. is is a strong and well-known objection to the Humean account of laws. Yet, as reasonable as this objection may seem, it is nowadays sometimes dismissed. e reason: its unjusti ed implicit assignment of equiprobability to each possible Humean mosaic; that is, its assumption of the principle of indi erence, which has been a acked on many grounds ever since it was rst proposed. In place of equiprobability, recent formal models represent the doxastic state of total ignorance as suspension of judgment. In this paper I revisit the cosmic coincidence objection to Humean laws by assessing which doxastic state we should endorse. By focusing on speci c features of our scenario I conclude that suspending judgment results in an unnecessarily weak doxastic state. First, I point out that recent literature in epistemology has provided independent justi cations of the principle of indi erence. Second, given that the argument is framed within a Humean metaphysics, it turns out that we are warranted to appeal to these justi cations and assign a uniform and additive credence distribution among Humean mosaics. is leads us to conclude that, contrary to widespread opinion, we should not dismiss the cosmic coincidence objection to the Humean account of laws.