Stable Seas: Gulf of Guinea

Abstract

and Senegal, as well as members of coastal communities in the aforementioned states. Many experts gave their time to discuss their experiences in the region, which was key to providing an unbiased representation of the issues addressed. Specific informants are not named in order to protect their anonymity, but the list of organizations consulted in the creation of the report includes the following, in addition to others who wish not to be named. The authors extend sincere deepest thanks to those who contributed to the report.

Threats of illegal, unregulated, and unreported fishing to biodiversity and food security in the Republic of the Congo

“…Furthermore, as many coastal developing countries often lack the capacity to fully exploit their national waters; they seek support from foreign countries who benefit by entering into agreements with, or buying fishing licenses from these coastal states (Okafor-Yarwood et al, 2020). Whilst such agreements generate income for the coastal country by allowing these distant water fleets to fish in their EEZs, this revenue is often a fraction of what is generated from the sale of the catch, with much of the catch exported (Dyhia Belhabib, Sumaila, Lam, et al, 2015).…”

“…Many countries in Western and Central Africa lack the financial and logistical resources to effectively police their waters and so are increasingly targeted by illegal fishing fleets (Doumbouya et al, 2017). This coupled with fleet overcapacity, inadequate fisheries regulations, corruption, and a lack of multinational cooperation facilitating vessel movement between jurisdictions means that illegal fishing in West Africa is estimated to account for an additional 40% to 65% of the reported (legal) catch (Agnew et al, 2009;Doumbouya et al, 2017); with countries such as Sierra Leone and Ghana suffering estimated costs of over $50 million USD per year (Okafor-Yarwood et al, 2020).…”

Sovereignty and Transnational Cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea: How a Network Approach can Strengthen the Yaoundé Architecture

“…Their responsibilities include political oversight by the two economic communities, coordination between the MMCCs in their economic community, and creating and maintaining standard operating procedures. They do not take part in day-to-day operations of vessels and information sharing (Okafor-Yarwood et al, 2020). Neither does the Interregional Coordination Centre (ICC) located in Yaoundé, Cameroon.…”

“…Signatory states are thus responsible for responding to instances of maritime crime. 4 However, states in the Gulf of Guinea generally lack maritime platforms, and navies and coast guards are generally deprioritised vis-à-vis their respective armies (Ali, 2014(Ali, , 2015Hassan & Hasan, 2017;Okafor-Yarwood et al, 2020). While some states possess more platforms than others, the Yaoundé Architecture does not automatically ensure that less resourceful states receive support.…”

“…The Yaoundé Architecture does not address this capacity and capability gap, and the YCC signatory states are solely responsible for their own maritime enforcement. International capacity-building efforts could contribute to addressing the gap, and the Architecture's ability to function as a point of entry is also highlighted as one of its key strengths (Okafor-Yarwood et al, 2020). It is also possible that an international naval presence could help close the gap, as it did in East Africa, but this raises issues of national sovereignty, which makes West African states reluctant to accept it (Okafor-Yarwood et al, 2021).…”