Stackelberg Contention Games in Multiuser Networks

Abstract

Interactions among selfish users sharing a common transmission channel can be modeled as a non-cooperative game using the game theory framework. When selfish users choose their transmission probabilities independently without any coordination mechanism, Nash equilibria usually result in a network collapse. We propose a methodology that transforms the non-cooperative game into a Stackelberg game. Stackelberg equilibria of the Stackelberg game can overcome the deficiency of the Nash equilibria of the original game. A particular type of Stackelberg intervention is constructed to show that any positive payoff profile feasible with independent transmission probabilities can be achieved as a Stackelberg equilibrium payoff profile. We discuss criteria to select an operating point of the network and informational requirements for the Stackelberg game.We relax the requirements and examine the effects of relaxation on performance. and its enhanced version, EDCF, competition among selfish users can lead to an inefficient use of the shared channel in Nash equilibria [2]. Similarly, a prisoner's dilemma phenomenon arises in a non-cooperative game for a generalized version of slotted-Aloha protocols [3].In general, if a game has Nash equilibria yielding low payoffs for the players, it will be desirable for them to transform the game to extend the set of equilibria to include better outcomes [4]. The

A Game Theoretic Analysis of Incentives in Content Production and Sharing Over Peer-to-Peer Networks

“…Intervention [38] refers to the system directly influencing the usage of users depending on their behavior.…”

“…The model of [22] can also be interpreted as using an intervention scheme, where the system no longer serves a peer when its cumulative average rating falls below a threshold level. [38] applies an intervention scheme to a multi-user access network, where the system can jam packets randomly with a probability that depends on the transmission probabilities of users. In [38], intervention affects all users in the system to the same degree, thus represented by a function that depends on the actions of all users.…”

“…[38] applies an intervention scheme to a multi-user access network, where the system can jam packets randomly with a probability that depends on the transmission probabilities of users. In [38], intervention affects all users in the system to the same degree, thus represented by a function that depends on the actions of all users. On the contrary, intervention considered in the CPS game, [7], and [22] influences a peer depending only on its own action, thus allowing the differential service to peers.…”

Repeated resource sharing among selfish players with imperfect binary feedback

“…[3]). Recently, a new class of resource sharing policies based on "intervention" [12] were proposed in 1 MAC games [14] and power control games [15].…”

Design and Analysis of Defection-Proof MAC Protocols Using a Repeated Game Framework

“…Nodes cannot communicate with each other and make their decisions independently based on their local information. The design of protocols in the presence of network manager was studied in pricing based networks [6], noncooperative Stackelberg equilibrium based networks [7], or correlated equilibrium based networks [8]. Our design methodology is based on a repeated game framework [9], where nodes can condition their transmission decisions on their past observations.…”