Stackelberg–Cournot dynamic game and risk management of heterogeneous supply chain enterprises under government carbon emission policy

Abstract

This paper presents the development of a model incorporating two manufacturers in a competitive carbon emissions trading market with varying degrees of market competitiveness. Among them, the manufacturer is in a limited market leadership position, and the game process lies between the Stackelberg game and the Cournot game. Additionally, the Pareto solution sets at various model periods are investigated. In addition, the model examined the effect of dynamic government adjustments on carbon emission limitations. The paper conducts an analysis of the fundamental factors contributing to system instability and evaluates the influence of various factors on the model's stability. At the same time, we also discussed the influence of government adjustment strategy on retail decision‐making and stability. The results highlight that the instability of the system is mainly caused by the adjustment strategy of the market leader, whereby the system becomes increasingly unstable as the market leader's position becomes stronger. In addition, the government's implementation of carbon emission limits will promote market stability.