Stackelberg game based co-firing biomass with coal under carbon cap-and-trade regulation

Abstract

Coal-fired power industry is under enormous pressure to accomplish carbon emission reduction targets. This paper proposes a bi-level multi-objective model for co-firing biomass with coal under carbon cap-and-trade regulation which considers a leader-follower Stackelberg game between the authority and the coal-fired power plants. The upper level regards social welfare maximization and allocation satisfaction maximization as its multiple objectives, while the lower level attempts to maximize the profits of each coal-fired power plant. The inherent uncertainty prompts the motivation for employing fuzzy set theory to characterize the uncertain parameters and determine their exact values. A case study from Shandong Province, China is provided to demonstrate the practicality and efficiency of the optimization model. [Formula: see text]-constraint method and interactive algorithm are used to solve the model, and furthermore the solutions associated with different free carbon emission quota levels and minimal allocation satisfactions have been generated to examine the influences. Based on the analysis and discussion, the methodology can meet the carbon emission reduction goals and transit to a lower-carbon power generation. It also assists the decision makers to develop desired quota allocation strategy in accordance with their attitudes and actual conditions.

A Time-and-Space-Network-Based Green Fleet Planning Model and Its Application for a Hub-and-Spoke Network

“…This assumption suggests that all parties know all the information at the time of decision making. This assumption is consistent with the one in reference [33] for the game problem. (4) Several parameters including demand level, variable operating costs, and fixed costs are considered uncertain; they represent the uncertain operating environment which is widely used in fleet planning methods [34][35][36].…”