2021 International Conference on Electronic Information Engineering and Computer Science (EIECS) 2021
DOI: 10.1109/eiecs53707.2021.9588024
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Stackelberg Game-Based Task Offloading Strategy for Multi-Users

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Cited by 5 publications
(2 citation statements)
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“…Algorithm 3. Backward induction assume that server sets the price of computing resource as: The final solution of the Stackelberg game is the Nash equilibrium [21], where all participants reach their optimal utility values. Once reached, changing one's strategy unilaterally does not result in an increase in utility value.…”
Section: ) Backward Induction Methods For Solving Stackelberg Gamementioning
confidence: 99%
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“…Algorithm 3. Backward induction assume that server sets the price of computing resource as: The final solution of the Stackelberg game is the Nash equilibrium [21], where all participants reach their optimal utility values. Once reached, changing one's strategy unilaterally does not result in an increase in utility value.…”
Section: ) Backward Induction Methods For Solving Stackelberg Gamementioning
confidence: 99%
“…The constraint (20) indicates that the total energy consumption of executing sub-tasks and transmitting sub-tasks for the LM should be less than its own total energy. The constraint (21) indicates that the energy consumption of executing sub-tasks for RM n should be less than its own total energy. The CC is generally considered to have infinite energy, so there is no energy constraint for it.…”
Section: Problem Formulationmentioning
confidence: 99%