2021
DOI: 10.1051/e3sconf/202125302020
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Stackelberg Model of Anti-terrorism Resource Allocation in Express Transportation Security Checks

Abstract: The problem of anti-terrorism security checks of express transportation becomes more and more severe under the Internet shopping model. In this paper, a Stackelberg game model of anti-terrorism resource allocation in express transportation security checks is built to discuss, in terms of single and multiple routes, the optimal resource allocation of express company (defender) including physical security measures, in-box sensor technology, non-intrusive security measures at terminal distribution sites and hando… Show more

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