Stackelberg versus Cournot duopoly with asymmetric costs: primary markups, entry deterrence, and a comparison of social welfare and industry profits

Zouhar, Jan; Zouharová, Martina

doi:10.1007/s40505-019-00167-3

Cited by 5 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…Theoretical and experimental studies have shown that the Stackelberg model is better than the Cournot model by allowing higher profits for firms and lower prices for consumers (Anderson & Engers, 1992;Huck et al, 2001). However, by introducing asymmetry into the duopoly (Colombo & Labrecciosa, 2019) or letting the number of firms be more than two (Zouhar & Zouharova, 2020), the Cournot model can be better than the Stackelberg. Usually, a secondmover advantage arises in a Stackelberg duopoly under price competition and product differentiation (Amir & Stepanova, 2006;Cheng & Tabuchi, 2010).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In the studies mentioned above, the duopoly model is developed by assuming a generalisation of the linear demand (Anderson & Engers, 1992), a linear inverse demand (Huck et al, 2001;Colombo & Labrecciosa, 2019;Zouhar & Zouharova, 2020;Cheng & Tabuchi, 2010;Kosuke et al, 2017;Kopel, 2021), or the demand function is not specified (Amir & Stepanova, 2006). In this study, we consider an isoelastic inverse demand function, which is derived by assuming that the market is governed by the Cobb-Douglas utility function.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Comparison between Simultaneous and Sequential Movements in a Duopoly Game

Ibrahim,

Zaibidi

2023

ASMScJ

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In general, a Stackelberg competition benefits the leader and the consumer due to making the first move in a sequential game. However, in this paper, sequential movement does not offer an advantage over simultaneous movement in a static duopoly under quantity competition with an isoelastic demand function. By introducing dynamics into the duopoly model through numerical simulations of simultaneous and sequential movements towards the Cournot equilibrium, there is evidence of first-mover advantage. However, simultaneous movement is advantageous over sequential movement in terms of better profits for both firms and lower prices for the consumer.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Comparison between Simultaneous and Sequential Movements in a Duopoly Game

Ibrahim,

Zaibidi

2023

ASMScJ

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“…Julien [26] investigated a Cournot oligopoly with several Stackelberg leaders and followers. Zouhar and Zouharova [27] have compared Cournot and Stackelberg equilibria.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Game-Theoretic Models of Coopetition in Cournot Oligopoly

Ougolnitsky

Korolev²

2023

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Coopetition means that in economic interactions, both competition and cooperation are presented in the same time. We built and investigated analytically and numerically game theoretic models of coopetition in normal form and in the form of characteristic function. The basic model in normal form reflects competition between firms in Cournot oligopoly and their cooperation in mutually profitable activities such as marketing, R&D, and environmental protection. Each firm divides its resource between competition and cooperation. In the model in normal form we study Nash and Stackelberg settings and compare the results. In cooperative setting we consider Neumann–Morgenstern, Petrosyan–Zaccour, and Gromova–Petrosyan versions of characteristic functions and calculate the respective Shapley values. The payoffs in all cases are compared, and the respective conclusions about the relative efficiency of different ways of organization for separate agents and the whole society are made.

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A Survey of the Latest Advances in Oligopoly Games

Geraskin

2023

Autom Remote Control

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Stackelberg versus Cournot duopoly with asymmetric costs: primary markups, entry deterrence, and a comparison of social welfare and industry profits

Cited by 5 publications

References 8 publications

Comparison between Simultaneous and Sequential Movements in a Duopoly Game

Comparison between Simultaneous and Sequential Movements in a Duopoly Game

Game-Theoretic Models of Coopetition in Cournot Oligopoly

A Survey of the Latest Advances in Oligopoly Games

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