Strategic Lawsuits against Public Participation (SLAPP lawsuits) are a legal tool for intimidating and silencing critical awareness. While their application was first and foremost recorded in the United States, over the last decade, they have generated significant attention of the professional and general public in Europe due to their constant growth. In 2024, this has led to the adoption of the anti-SLAPP Directive by the European Parliament. This paper examines the relationship between the increase in strategic lawsuits in selected European countries and their democratic status, examined on the basis of two indicators: media freedom and judicial independence. The author further investigates the relationship between the trend in the number of strategic lawsuits and judicial efficiency. The aim is to determine whether strategic lawsuits are characteristic of the countries with low democratic status (not-free or partly free countries), a low degree of media freedom and judicial independence, as well as the countries with inefficient courts and judicial procedures. To this effect, the author has conducted a statistical analysis, which indicates that strategic lawsuits are present in all countries, regardless of the level of development of democratic institutions, the state of media freedom, judicial independence, and the efficiency of the judiciary. Based on this finding, the author concludes by raising some questions which are to be addressed in further research into the social, political, and legal phenomenon of SLAPP lawsuits.