Stakes and Risks in Economic Sanctions

Bayard, Thomas O.; Pelzman, Joseph; Pérez‐López, Jorge F.

doi:10.1111/j.1467-9701.1983.tb00037.x

Cited by 25 publications

(8 citation statements)

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“…The larger impact of UN sanctions is expected because such sanctions typically prevent the target from recouping economic losses by locating substitute trade and investment partners, whereas unilateral sanctions leave this possibility open. Because the impact of sanctions on a nation’s economic welfare depends on the extent to which the sanctions limit the target’s total access to trade (Bayard, Pelzman, and Perez‐Lopez 1983), multilateral sanctions should have a more profound effect on aggregate economic growth compared with unilateral sanctions.…”

Section: Analysis and Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“A Hand upon the Throat of the Nation”: Economic Sanctions and State Repression, 1976-2001

Wood

2008

International Studies Quarterly

242

164

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While intended as a nonviolent foreign policy alternative to military intervention, sanctions have often worsened humanitarian and human rights conditions in the target country. This article examines the relationship between economic sanctions and state‐sponsored repression of human rights. Drawing on both the public choice and institutional constraints literature, I argue that the imposition of economic sanctions negatively impacts human rights conditions in the target state by encouraging incumbents to increase repression. Specifically, sanctions threaten the stability of target incumbents, leading them to augment their level of repression in an effort to stabilize the regime, protect core supporters, minimize the threat posed by potential challengers, and suppress popular dissent. The empirical results support this theory. These findings provide further evidence that sanctions impose political, social, and physical hardship on civilian populations. They also underscore a need for improvements in current strategies and mechanisms by which states pursue foreign‐policy goals and the international community enforces international law and stability.

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Section: Analysis and Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“A Hand upon the Throat of the Nation”: Economic Sanctions and State Repression, 1976-2001

Wood

2008

International Studies Quarterly

242

164

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“…We will argue that although multilateral sanctions might indeed often produce greater terms-of-trade effects than unilateral sanctions, there is an important distinction between economic impacts of sanctions and political impacts. Hufbauer,3 See, for example, Bayard, Pelzman, andPerez-Lopez, 1983, andWillett andJalalighajar, 1983/84. 4 Public-choice theorists are of course not alone in pointing at the significance of domestic political processes as both causes and effects of sanctions.…”

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confidence: 99%

Unilateral Versus Multilateral International Sanctions: A Public Choice Perspective

1999

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Multilateral economic sanctions can be expected to impose greaterterms‐of‐trade effects on a target nation than unilateral sanctions. Yet despite their potential for greater economic damage, multilateral sanctions often are less effective in bringing about desired political results in the target. An interest‐group model of endogenous policy suggests that multilateral sanctions can undermine the political effectiveness of opposition groups in the targetcountry, or strengthen those groups supporting the objectionable policy of the ruling regime. Such perverse effects are due in part to the inability of multilateral coalitions to enforce cooperation among members, and to the appropriation of sanctions rents in the target country. Unilateral sanctions, however, imposed by a country with close ties to the target, are ofteneffective in achieving their intended political objectives.

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“…The decision, however, was also the product of the almost insuperable obstacles that confront any attempts at embargo, probably the most common form of macroeconomic statecraft. For a good discussion, see Bayard, Pelzman, and Lopez 1983. 4. Externalities are uncompensated costs or benefits that an agent inflicts or confers on third parties.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%