Stand by Me—Experiments on Help and Commitment in Coordination Games

Abstract

We present experiments studying how high-ability individuals use help to foster efficient coordination. After an initial phase that traps groups in a low-productivity equilibrium, incentives to coordinate are increased, making it possible to escape this performance trap. The design varies whether high-ability individuals can offer help and, if so, whether they must commit to help for an extended period. If help is chosen on a round-by-round basis, the probability of escaping the performance trap is slightly reduced by allowing for help. The likelihood of success significantly improves if high-ability individuals must commit to help for an extended time. We develop and estimate a structural model of sophisticated learning that provides an explanation for why commitment is necessary. The key insight is that potential leaders who are overly optimistic about their ability to teach their followers are too fast to eliminate help in the absence of commitment.Data, as supplemental material, are available at http://dx

Legitimacy, Communication, and Leadership in the Turnaround Game

“…Leading by example (Cartwright, Gilletand van Vugt, 2013), communication from a leader requesting greater effort by group members (Brandts and Cooper, 2007;Chaudhuri and Paichayontvijit, 2010), and help with commitment from high ability types to low ability types (Brandts, Cooper, Fatas and Qi, 2013) can all increase the odds of escaping a productivity trap.…”

Efficient Large‐size Coordination via Voluntary Group Formation: An Experiment

“…Other measures to combat the fragility of trust in fellow members’ risk tolerance include having leadership establish itself in a heterogeneous environment (Brandts et al., ), allowing for communication in various ways (Blume and Ortmann, ; Chaudhuri et al, 2009), and having teams make the coordination decisions (Feri et al., ). Also, additional sanctioning of the coordination outcome may help.…”

“…Brandts et al. (2011) offer further excellent illustrations: “When individuals’ inputs to firm production are strong complements, the group's performance is constrained by its lowest performing individual. An assembly line moves no faster than the slowest person in the line, a report doesn't get finished until the last person completes their section, and a meeting can't start when a key attendee is late.…”

On the voluntary provision of “weakest‐link” public goods: The case of private information

“…many applications in the literature, including providing levees (Hirshleifer, 1983), securing alliance perimeters (Murdoch, 1995), dredging successive stretches of a navigation channel (Harrison & Hirshleifer, 1989), eradicating disease (Arce & Sandler, 2002), producing goods via an assembly line (Brandts & Cooper, 2006), coauthoring reports (Brandts, Cooper, Fatas, & Qi, 2013), and combatting terrorism (Sandler, 2003). While many authors have studied such "weakest-link" models of public goods, we suppose players differ in their abilities to contribute toward the public good, and we model this through private cost parameters.…”

“…For a theoretical perspective in full-information environments, seeSandler and Vicary (2001);Vicary (1990);Vicary and Sandler (2002). For a closely related notion, see the experimental treatment of "help" inBrandts et al (2013) and references therein.…”