State and Faith: Right-wing Populism and Nationalized Religion in Hungary

Bozóki, András; Ádám, Zoltán

doi:10.17356/ieejsp.v2i1.143

Cited by 31 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…the Catholic Church in Poland, on the contrary, stand for nationalism and sometimes even openly endorse populist radical right (Markowski, 2016). A similar phenomenon was described in Hungary (A ´dám and Bozóki, 2016a). While our data do not allow examining the role of the clergy and the clerical elite, our results definitely call for more research on their role in limiting or strengthening the connection between religion and support for the radical right.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 48%

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Do religious voters support populist radical right parties? Opposite effects in Western and East-Central Europe

Marcinkiewicz

Dassonneville

2021

Party Politics

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The rise of populist radical right parties fuels a discussion about the roots of their success. Existing research has demonstrated the relevance of gender, education and income for explaining the far-right vote. The present study contributes to the aforementioned debate by focusing on the role of religiosity. The data collected in the eighth round of the European Social Survey (2016) allow examining in more detail the political relevance of attendance at religious services and other measures of religious devotion. This study focuses in particular on 15 countries, 11 from Western Europe and 4 from East-Central Europe. In none of the Western European countries is there evidence of a positive relationship between religiosity and vote for a populist radical right party. In fact, in many countries of this region more religious voters are substantively less inclined to support far-right movements. The situation is different in parts of East-Central Europe. In Poland, and to a weaker extent also in Hungary, the probability of a vote for right-wing populists increases with religiosity.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 48%

“…The present analysis intends to close this gap. It does so by focusing on one aspect which, with few exceptions (A ´dám and Bozóki, 2016a;Allen, 2017;Arzheimer and Carter, 2009;Montgomery and Winter, 2015), has not received much attention in work on the success of right-wing populists: religiosity.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Do religious voters support populist radical right parties? Opposite effects in Western and East-Central Europe

Marcinkiewicz

Dassonneville

2021

Party Politics

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“…Szűcs (2012: 137) mentions virtualization as a frequently applied discoursive strategy, that is the discoursive construction of an alternative action space through amplifying the religious, sacral dimension of the moral concepts inherent to the neoconservative ideology and using religious connotations for legitimating the party’s claim for political power. Similarly, Ádám and Bozóki (2016) argue that Hungarian right-wing populist discourse has conceived the ethnically defined nation as a sacred entity, and has attached religious attributes to national identification. The government’s political rhetoric and symbolic imagery of the nation have been greatly shaped by the electoral struggles between Fidesz and the extreme right Jobbik party before the 2010 elections, and the mainstreaming of far-right nativist discourses and policies by Fidesz after 2010 (Bozóki, 2016).…”

Section: Religion and Nationalism In Hungarian Right-wing Populismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Education for a Christian nation: Religion and nationalism in the Hungarian education policy discourse

Neumann

2022

European Educational Research Journal

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In the past decade, right-wing populist parties have brought back nationalism and religion into European politics. While a growing literature explores the political strategies, style and success of these parties and the challenge they pose to the European project, less attention has been paid to how right-wing populist governing is done at specific policy areas. This paper explores the education policy discourse of the Hungarian right-wing populist government. Drawing on the Discourse-Historical Approach to critical discourse analysis, the analysis concentrates on political speeches performed between 2010 and 2020 to examine the discoursive framings and strategies utilised in relation to three nodal points identified in the speeches: upbringing, teaching Christian values and the nation. While in the political rhetoric, a coherent religious nationalist, neoconservative narrative took form, over time this narrative shifted from a strategic project of crafting a new language to justify paradigmatic legislative and policy change to a language disconnected from policy work and predominantly displaying features of nationalist extremism. In the discussed period, as a combined result of the right-wing government’s Christian indentitarian project and the ambition of the Christian churches to increase their power and legitimacy, religion has increasingly permeated the secular spaces of Hungarian education.

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“…On the fusion of national and religious identities in Central and Eastern Europe, see Grzymała-Busse (2015). On how populist radical rightwing forces reinterpret religion and reframe Christianity in a non-universalistic, nationalist way to legitimise their rule in Central and Eastern Europe, see Bozóki and Zoltán (2012). 31 See, 'The Age Gap in Religion Around the World', Pew Research Center, 13 June 2018, available at: http://www.pewforum.org/2018/06/13/the-age-gap-in-religion-around-the-world/, accessed 10 June 2020.…”

Section: Order or Chaos?mentioning

confidence: 99%

From Revolution to ‘Counter-Revolution’: Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe 30 Years On

Zielonka

Rupnik

2020

Europe-Asia Studies

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The essay explains the origin, scope and forms of the anti-liberal surge taking place in Central and Eastern Europe. Why have voters across the region deserted the liberal politicians who managed to secure peace and prosperity on the ashes of communism? Does the erosion of democratic values and institutions lead to autocracy, or something novel? Special attention will be devoted to the issue of order and chaos in the broader European setting. Can order be maintained without shared values across EU member states? The conclusions will point to the variety of hybrid regimes in Central and Eastern Europe and assess their impact. CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE IS AGAIN MAKING HEADLINES, but for very different reasons than was the case in the years following 1989. After years of impressive progress in which communist states were transformed into liberal ones, the region now has taken another turn, this time towards a new version of authoritarian politics. After dismantling the walls dividing states and societies, Central and Eastern Europe is now erecting new walls, albeit in different forms and places. After making enormous efforts to join European institutions, the region is now undermining these institutions. After struggling for the human and civil rights denied by communism, the region now promotes exclusive versions of national and religious communities. The pandemic has only reinforced the authoritarian tendencies in the region, with some of the governments using the emergency powers for their partisan political ends (Martin 2020). At the helm of this 'counter-revolution' against the fruits of the liberal revolutions of 1989 are not old communists trying to regain power but people who were among those who initiated the region's 'return to Europe' three decades earlier; Viktor Orbán and Jarosław Kaczyński are the most prominent among them. The revolutions of 1989 progressed through mass mobilisation and negotiation; the counter-revolution currently taking place is being forged through the ballot box. Populist politicians do not organise strikes or build barricades: they simply win elections. The revolutions of 1989 caused disruption and economic pain, whilst the current counter-revolution can pride itself on enjoying economic growth. The revolutions of 1989 were about 'catching up' with Europe, sometimes in demeaning conditions. The current counter-revolution is about restoring local pride and

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State and Faith: Right-wing Populism and Nationalized Religion in Hungary

Cited by 31 publications

References 27 publications

Do religious voters support populist radical right parties? Opposite effects in Western and East-Central Europe

Do religious voters support populist radical right parties? Opposite effects in Western and East-Central Europe

Education for a Christian nation: Religion and nationalism in the Hungarian education policy discourse

From Revolution to ‘Counter-Revolution’: Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe 30 Years On

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