State capacity and the paradox of authoritarian elections

Seeberg, Merete Bech

doi:10.1080/13510347.2014.960210

Cited by 76 publications

(38 citation statements)

References 45 publications

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“…Autocrats presiding over a highly capable state may abuse the bureaucracy to subtly manipulate voters and the electoral framework. Moreover, a strong coercive apparatus serves to prevent opposition mobilization and post-electoral protests (Seeberg, 2014). Thus, elections are more likely to stabilize authoritarian regimes endowed with high levels of state capacity.…”

Section: State Capacity and Elections In Authoritarian Regimesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…While the association between the strength of state capacity and the survival of democracy is by now a well-established research field (Moller and Skaaning, 2014;Carbone and Memoli, 2015), and a number of quantitative (Andersen et al, 2014;Seeberg, 2014) and qualitative (Slater, 2008;Way, 2005;Levitsky and Way, 2010) studies hint at a positive link between state capacity and autocratic regime stability, the relationship between state capacity and electoral authoritarianism remains largely unexplored.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Introduction: State capacity and elections in the study of authoritarian regimes

Croissant

Hellmann

2017

International Political Science Review

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Studies of multiparty elections in authoritarian regimes have proliferated in recent years.Nevertheless, the available evidence remains inconclusive in terms of when, where, or why elections work to sustain or undermine authoritarian rule. The contributions to the special issue "State Capacity, Elections and the Resilience of Authoritarian Rule" argue that analyzing the extent to which the effect of elections on authoritarian regime resilience is mediated through the factor of state capacity helps to solve this puzzle. This introduction lays the analytical foundation for this discussion by reviewing key terms and concepts, and by highlighting possible theoretical connections between the state capacity literature on the one hand and the electoral authoritarianism literature on the other. Furthermore, it considers the contributions in this special issue, and points out areas of agreement and disagreement between the authors, while simultaneously placing the different arguments within the broader field of enquiry.

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Section: State Capacity and Elections In Authoritarian Regimesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Introduction: State capacity and elections in the study of authoritarian regimes

Croissant

Hellmann

2017

International Political Science Review

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“…However, not all regime-sponsored coercion is of the 'high intensity' type (Levitsky and Way, 2010: 57-59), regimes may also resort to 'low intensity' coercion -that is, more subtle practices of physical harassment and intimidation, such as denying opposition members certain employment opportunities or targeting them for tax inspections. Such forms of soft repression, then, may depend more on the state's administrative capacity than its coercive capacity (Seeberg, 2014(Seeberg, : 1271.…”

Section: The State As a Regime Tool: The Importance Of The Contextualmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Existing studies that explore the effect of state capacity on the resilience of authoritarian regimes (e.g. Slater and Fenner, 2011;Andersen et al, 2014;Seeberg, 2014) tend to focus primarily on the infrastructural component of state capacity, thus ignoring the 'embeddedness' part of the capacity function.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

High capacity, low resilience: The ‘developmental’ state and military–bureaucratic authoritarianism in South Korea

Hellmann

2017

International Political Science Review

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This article argues that high levels of state capacity are not a sufficient condition for consolidating autocratic rule. Rather, whether non-democratic rulers can harness the infrastructural power of the state to implement strategies of regime stabilization depends on three crucial factors: the state's social embedding, the international context, and the extent of elite cohesion. The paper develops this argument through a case study of the military-bureaucratic regime in South Korea (1961Korea ( -1987, which -despite a high-capacity 'developmental' state at its disposal -failed to maintain high levels of resilience.

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“…Some scholars have argued that developing strong state institutions is an important pre-condition for successful democratization, both by preventing instability and conflict in transitional regimes as well as by enabling newly democratic governments to gain legitimacy by providing public services to citizens (Carothers, 2007;Fukuyama, 2014;Mansfield and Snyder, 2007;Fortin, 2012;Mazucca and Munck, 2014). Yet, state capacity may serve those same functions in autocratic regimes, and in addition help further sustain authoritarianism by strengthening autocrats' capacity to fabricate support and oppress dissent (Schedler, 2013;Seeberg, 2014;Way, 2005;Slater, 2012), suggesting state capacity might be equally important for both democratic and autocratic stability (Anderson et al, 2014;Slater, 2012;Slater and Fenner, 2011).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

State Capacity, Incumbent Turnover and Democratic Change in Authoritarian Elections

Ham

Seim

2017

SSRN Journal

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Under what conditions do elections lead to democratization or conversely, sustain authoritarianism? State capacity may be a crucial intervening variable affecting the democratizing power of elections in authoritarian regimes. In regimes with limited state capacity, manipulating elections, co-opting elites, and repressing opposition is more difficult than in regimes with more extensive state capacity, rendering turnover in elections more likely in weak states. Yet, while increasing the chances of turnover, if the new incumbent has limited capacity to deliver public services and make policy changes after coming to power, democratic change is unlikely to be sustainable. Hence, state capacity may be a double-edged sword. This paper tests these expectations using Varieties of Democracy data for 460 elections in 110 authoritarian regimes from 1974 to 2012, and finds that state capacity is negatively associated with incumbent turnover but positively associated with democratic change after incumbent turnover in electoral authoritarian regimes.3

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State capacity and the paradox of authoritarian elections

Cited by 76 publications

References 45 publications

Introduction: State capacity and elections in the study of authoritarian regimes

Introduction: State capacity and elections in the study of authoritarian regimes

High capacity, low resilience: The ‘developmental’ state and military–bureaucratic authoritarianism in South Korea

State Capacity, Incumbent Turnover and Democratic Change in Authoritarian Elections

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