State Fragility, Social Contracts and the Role of Social Protection: Perspectives from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region

Abstract

Social contracts and state fragility represent two sides of one coin. The former concept highlights that governments need to deliver three “Ps”—protection, provision, and political participation—to be acceptable for societies, whereas the latter argues that states can fail due to lack of authority (inhibiting protection), capacity (inhibiting provision), or legitimacy. Defunct social contracts often lead to popular unrest. Using empirical evidence from the Middle East and North Africa, we demonstrate how different notions of state fragility lead to different kinds of grievances and how they can be remedied by measures of social protection. Social protection is always a key element of government provision and hence a cornerstone of all social contracts. It can most easily counteract grievances that were triggered by decreasing provision (e.g., after subsidy reforms in Iran and Morocco) but also partially substitute for deficient protection (e.g., by the Palestinian National Authority, in pre-2011 Yemen) or participation (information campaign accompanying Moroccan subsidy cut; participatory set-ups for cash-for-work programmes in Jordan). It can even help maintain a minimum of state–society relations in states defunct in all three Ps (e.g., Yemen). Hence, social protection can be a powerful instrument to reduce state fragility and mend social contracts. Yet, to be effective, it needs to address grievances in an inclusive, rule-based, and non-discriminatory way. In addition, to gain legitimacy, governments should assume responsibility over social protection instead of outsourcing it to foreign donors.

Follow the hand that feeds you? The effects of non‐governmental cash transfers on citizenship

“…2.1 | Social contract, citizenship and CT Throughout history, widely supported social contract theories argue that the citizens of a state recognise the latter as legitimate only as long as it provides them with satisfying levels of protection, provision of economic and social services, and participation in political decision-making processes. Only under these circumstances, in fact, a fruitful and long-lasting stipulation of the social contract, with shared and mutual responsibilities among the state and its citizens, could take place (Loewe & Zintl, 2021). In the 'classic' social contract equilibrium, in return for the provision of services, citizens bestow a certain degree of legitimacy upon the government, adhere to the rule of law and contribute to financing the state through taxes (see Figure 1), even though the individual level of acquiescence to national authority clearly depends on a range of factors, including prior expectations and ease in attributing performance to the government (McLoughlin, 2018).…”

Disentangling the Relationship Between Social Protection and Social Cohesion: Introduction to the Special Issue

“…In addition, we assume social protection schemes strengthen vertical trust —at least if they are implemented or financed by the state (Burchi et al 2020 ; Haider and Mcloughlin 2016 ; Loewe and Zintl 2021 ). Their beneficiaries are likely to be grateful to the actors that support them financially or by providing efficient instruments to deal with risk and poverty.…”

The social contract in Egypt, Lebanon and Tunisia: What do the people want?

“…Egypt's government, in particular, routinely points to the example of war‐affected MENA countries to present itself as the only guarantor of security, while at the same time cutting down on provision and protection (Loewe & Westemeier, 2018; Vidican Auktor & Loewe, 2021). Other governments have increased the overall level of spending on provision (public sector jobs, social assistance and minimum wages) in the immediate aftermath of the Arab uprisings, only to massively reduce it once the revolutionary dust had settled (ESCWA, 2017; Loewe & Zintl, 2021). What is more, the first decade after the uprisings has not witnessed substantial reforms—with the partial exception of Morocco—in economic policies, for example, to promote competition, the rule of law, innovation, structural diversification and service delivery.…”

“…Other countries (such as Yemen or Libya), however, fail in all three ‘Ps’. They no longer sustain nationwide social contracts; instead, the government and opposition armies try to build up social contracts as good as they can at the sub‐national level in the territories they control (Loewe & Zintl, 2021).…”