State Interventions and Interlocal Collaborations Across the Three Pillars of Sustainability

Abstract

The literature on interlocal sustainability has acknowledged that the resources and authority of state governments influence the collaborative sustainability policy actions of local governments. However, there is an absence of empirical evidence that shows how this influence varies across the environmental protection, economic development, and social equity pillars of sustainability. This study uses data from a 2015 national survey of U.S. cities to shed light on the connection between state-level interventions and regional partnerships across the three primary sustainability policy dimensions. With an understanding gleaned from the concept of contested federalism, this analysis employed Bayesian techniques to examine how state fiscal support for sustainability, along with fiscal and functional decentralization in state systems, affect municipal collaborative policy efforts. The findings suggest a positive link between supportive state-level endeavors and local-level collaborations. However, state influences can have different implications across the three pillars of sustainability.

Policy mechanisms for interlocal service delivery: management perspectives in the USA and Norway

“…Future research may continue to investigate the efficacy of ILC mechanisms and the managerial motivations toward collaborative activities in contrasting circumstances. Moreover, scholars and researchers have only recently begun the systematic examination of ILC linkages and other characteristics of collaboration for program implementation, and the increase of practitioner interest in interlocal arrangements provides purpose for expanded inquiry (Costumato, 2021; Farmer, 2022; Mandell and Steelman, 2003). More research is required in the differentiation and categorization of the evolving policy mechanisms used in public service delivery and other intermunicipal initiatives.…”

“…In Norway, national laws define options for ILC mechanisms (Arntsen et al, 2018;Klausen and Torsteinsen, 2023;Zeiner and Tjerbo, 2014) that mandate formalized reporting, oversight boards and governance structures (NMLG, 1999(NMLG, , 2018. On the contrary, the entrepreneurial latitude and layered federal configuration of USA municipalities encourage informality (Farmer, 2022;Fowler, 2018;Weber and Khademian, 2008). American federalism contributes to expectations of autonomy and localization in service delivery needs (Kettl, 2006) and offers more actors for ILC.…”

The Transaction Costs of the Administrative Presidency: Evidence From a Trump-Era Clean Water Act Enforcement Reduction

“…Much of the research on intergovernmental transaction costs has explored the costs of delegating bureaucratic authority from the standpoint of the states' relationships with the national government (Epstein & O'Halloran, 1999;Horn, 1995;Rabe, 2011), and more recently the hierarchical complexities of statelocal relations (Bery & Haddad, 2023;Farmer, 2022aFarmer, , 2022bHomsy et al, 2019;Huang & Berry, 2022;Youm & Feiock, 2019). However, the complexities of transaction cost federalism can also manifest in the relationship between the federal and local governments (Farmer, 2015).…”

“…Therefore, we ask the following question: Do federal reductions in CWA enforcement lead to poor SDWA implementation outcomes at the local government level? To explore this question, we advance a theoretical understanding using a transaction cost perspective of federalism (Farmer 2022a(Farmer , 2022bFeiock, 2008;Rabe, 2011;Youm & Feiock, 2019) to explain how the policy misalignment between the CWA executive order and SDWA implementation led to distinct transaction costs for local government CWSs. The lack of enforcement of CWA standards can pose political transaction costs that can give rise to agency problems that derive from expost opportunistic behavior (Feiock, 2008).…”

Whose Neighborhood Needs? Assessing the Spatial Distribution of Federal Community Development Funds

“…Governments with higher levels of need often have more access to intergovernmental resources (Feiock et al 2001;Craw 2006Craw , 2010Kaufmann and Wittwer 2019). This larger share of intergovernmental revenues can also increase the organizational capacity for these decisions (Deslatte and Stokan 2020;Hall and Handley 2011), bringing greater involvement of public sector participants into the economic development process (Farmer 2022).…”