State Legislative Professionalism and Gubernatorial Effectiveness, 1978-1991

Dilger, Robert Jay; Krause, George A.; Moffett, Randolph R.

doi:10.2307/440193

Cited by 45 publications

(41 citation statements)

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“…Obviously, this type of shift may have democratic costs, and some empirical evidence suggests that gubernatorial power may not necessarily come at the expense of legislative power. Dilger, Krause, and Moff ett (1995 ) observe that states with higher levels of institutional legislative power seem to have stronger and more eff ective governors. Also, some evidence suggests that legislatures with more responsibility for budgets (typically refl ecting shared budgetary authority with the governor) may manage the public purse more responsibly and may be more interested in agency effi ciency.…”

Section: Fragmentation and Micromanagementmentioning

confidence: 94%

Legislative Influences on Performance Management Reform

Bourdeaux

Chikoto

2008

Public Administration Review

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In keeping with Hatry (1999) , in this analysis, performance management is defi ned as a reform that focuses on the use of performance measures in policy making, management, and budget decisions, as well as a philosophical shift to focus on results rather than inputs or A dilemma in the design of democratic institutions is that the institutional arrangements that emphasize one set of objectives may undermine others.

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Section: Fragmentation and Micromanagementmentioning

confidence: 94%

Legislative Influences on Performance Management Reform

Bourdeaux

Chikoto

2008

Public Administration Review

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“…Determining the causes of legislative professionalization in the states is an important research challenge. Professionalism has been used as an independent variable to explain myriad political outcomes, including divided government and partisan composition (Fiorina 1994;Squire 1997;Stonecash and Agathangelou 1997), interest group activity (Berkman 2001), membership diversity (Squire 1992), policy responsiveness (Maestas 2000), gubernatorial effectiveness (Dilger, Krause, and Moffett 1995), incumbent reelection (Berry, Berkman, and Schneiderman 2000), congressional candidacies (Berkman 1993(Berkman , 1994Berkman and Eisenstein 1999), and membership stability (Squire 1988). We need to develop our understanding of why state legislatures have become more professional, a phenomenon that has had an impact on aspects of state government ranging from public policy outputs to election results.…”

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confidence: 99%

Government Growth and Professionalism in U.S. State Legislatures

Malhotra

2006

Legislative Studies Qtrly

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This article analyzes the professionalization of American state legislatures since the 1960s and expands on previous studies by considering the strategic incentives of members. Fiorina and Noll's (1978a, 1978b) theory that reelection‐minded legislators serve as “ombudsmen to the bureaucracy” on behalf of their constituents suggests that legislatures have professionalized in response to growth in public spending in order to strengthen members' abilities to handle increased facilitation duties. I used longitudinal analysis and instrumental variables regression to test this hypothesis and disentangle causal directionality, since professional legislators may have the means and incentive to spend more than their citizen counterparts. Both methods revealed empirical support for the Fiorina and Noll hypothesis that spending increases caused legislators to become more professional.

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“…As a result, the executive branch is, counter-intuitively, relatively less constrained as the legislature professionalizes. Professionalized legislatures have also been shown to enable rather than inhibit governors' implementation of their legislative agendas (Dilger, Krauss, Moffett 1995, Ferguson 2003. While this result is less well-understood, it may also rest on the idea that legislators in professional legislatures are more likely to be judged on quantity of legislative activity and thus more interested in participating in any agenda.…”

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confidence: 86%

Policy Uncertainty and Manufacturing Investment: Evidence from U.S. State Elections

Shelton

Falk

2016

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. We estimate the effect of electorally induced policy uncertainty on investment in the manufacturing sector. Because state governors exercise considerable influence over legislation and considerable discretion over regulation and permitting, and because the policies relevant to business investment vary systematically by party, uncertainty over the partisan affiliation of the future governor is a source of political risk to firms considering business investment. More importantly, the lack of an incumbent in a race due to term limits raises uncertainty over the outcome, providing a convincing instrument that allows us to estimate causal effects. We find that, in a state with average partisan polarization, in the calendar year of a gubernatorial election, the elasticity of investment to the eventual margin of victory is 0.027. Both the significance and magnitude of this result are robust to various controls, measures, and estimators. Importantly, the investment decline is not reversed the following year. We show that own-state uncertainty is associated with a large and significant rise in neighboring states' investment, suggesting that rather than postponing investment to the future, the effect of policy uncertainty at the subnational level is to drive investment to alternative sites. Terms of use: Documents inJEL-Codes: D720, E020, E640.

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State Legislative Professionalism and Gubernatorial Effectiveness, 1978-1991

Cited by 45 publications

References 0 publications

Legislative Influences on Performance Management Reform

Legislative Influences on Performance Management Reform

Government Growth and Professionalism in U.S. State Legislatures

Policy Uncertainty and Manufacturing Investment: Evidence from U.S. State Elections

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