State Mobilization in Authoritarian Regimes: Youth Politics and Regime Legitimation in Cambodia

Abstract

This article explains the political significance of the Union of Youth Federations of Cambodia, the quasi-youth wing of the ruling Cambodian People's Party in Cambodia. I argue that pro-regime events organized by the youth wing are a form of state mobilization designed to help the ruling party pre-empt the threat posed by the country's growing youth population. In doing so, the youth wing draws upon the monarchy, culture, and nationalism to regenerate the ruling party's legitimacy claims to make them more appealing to the target group. The article contributes to our knowledge of how authoritarian regimes mobilize citizens to maintain power.

Civil Society Between Repression and Cooptation: Adjusting to Shrinking Space in Cambodia

“…These developments emboldened civil society, as exemplified by several CSOs' foray into the electoral arena (Norén-Nilsson 2019; Norén-Nilsson and Eng 2020). Similarly, the 2013 to 2017 period saw a substantial increase in street protests (Vong 2022). The opening, however, did not last long.…”

“…In addition, the CPP is increasingly controlling civil society space through the creation of GONGOs and other coopted CSOs (HRW 2021). The Union of Youth Federations of Cambodia, the CPP's youth wing, which portrays itself as an NGO, increasingly engages in "regime-sponsored citizen mobilisation", including through educational and cultural events, job fairs, and the provision of health services (Vong 2022, quote on 412). In June 2016, the Civil Society Alliance Forum (CSAF) was created by government subdecree.…”

“…), this assumption is, to a certain extent, contradicted by the example of cooptation through [ruling] parties, which he provides (ibid.). Rather than merely organising elite circulation among the ruling elite, autocratic parties - and parliaments - can also act as important intermediaries between the regime and the population (e.g., Weipert-Fenner 2021, e.g., 10; 40; 46), a function they share with civil society (Edwards and Hulme 1996a, 1996b). Accordingly, it can be assumed that, just like in the case of oppositional party leaders, autocratic regime elites might also seek to coopt civil society leaders and CSOs to make them “act in line with the ruling elite's demands” (Gerschewski 2013, 22).…”