State ownership and corruption

Billon, Steve; Gillanders, Robert

doi:10.1007/s10797-015-9390-z

Cited by 21 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 33 publications

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“…Third, we control for firm size using the natural logarithm of sales (see Fan et al, 2009). Fourth, we include a variable which measures the extent of state ownership (see Fan et al, 2009;Billon and Gillanders, 2014). 4 Like our foreign ownership variable, state-owned companies have access to different social and political networks, potentially affecting the level of bribery.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Gender and Corruption in Business

Breen

Gillanders

McNulty

et al. 2016

The Journal of Development Studies

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Are women less corrupt in business? We revisit this question using firm-level data from the World Bank's Enterprise Surveys, which measure firms' experience of corruption and the gender of their owners and top managers. We find that women in positions of influence are associated with less corruption: female-owned businesses pay less in bribes and corruption is seen as less of an obstacle in companies where women are represented in top management. By providing evidence that women are, ethically at least, good for business our research contributes to the literature on development, gender equality, and corruption more generally.JEL Classification: D73, G32, J16, M14

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Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Gender and Corruption in Business

Breen

Gillanders

McNulty

et al. 2016

The Journal of Development Studies

Self Cite

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“…In general, greater decentralization of the government (with physical and fiscal decentralization considered by alternate studies) is shown to lower corruption through its promotion of greater transparency. A larger government size might imply state ownership of certain enterprises and that has been shown to link with corrupt activity (Billion and Gillanders, 2016). The results with respect to the impact of government size are more mixed in the literature, with evidence consistent with an increase in corruption via an increase in bureaucratic red tape (Goel and Nelson, 1998) and with a decrease in corruption, via a larger government size, partly associated with more checks and balances (Goel and Nelson, 2010).…”

Section: Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Direct and indirect influences of political regimes on corruption

Goel

Nelson

2021

Social Science Quarterly

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This paper studies the direct and indirect impacts of political regimes on corruption. Whereas the interplay of government is fundamental to corrupt acts, the present research sheds new light by showing the direct and indirect influences of dimensions of government structure on corruption. Methods: We employ two different estimation techniques. First, we use OLS regressions, with year and regional dummies. Second, we employ mediation analysis to account for the intermediate role of government size in the relation between government structure and corruption in order to gauge the direct and indirect influences on corruption Results: Results show that government structure, across various dimensions of authoritarian and nonauthoritarian regimes, significantly impacted cross-national corruption. In particular, a nation's stock of democracy and parliamentary systems lowered corruption, while executive tenure and dimensions of authoritarianism added to corruption. On the other hand, the size of the legislature did not matter when it came to corruption. However, the direct influences of these government structure variables are mitigated or reinforced when the intermediate role of government size is considered in a mediation analysis. Conclusions: The breakdown into the direct and indirect effects on corruption is a novel insight of this work, with useful policy implications.

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“…The World Bank takes several precautions in its surveys to reduce measurement errors in the Bribe variable. First, in line with the empirical research on the corruption theme, the question refers to 'establishments like this' to help provoke truthful responses (Billon & Gillanders, 2016). This indirect formulation of the question implies that respondents are not asked to confess that their establishment has paid bribes but to gauge the behavior of similar types of establishment.…”

Section: Data and Samplementioning

confidence: 99%

Petty corruption on firm level innovation of MSMEs: Evidence from emerging economies

2019

El Sawah, S. (Ed.) MODSIM2019, 23rd International Congress on Modelling and Simulation.

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In this study, we examine how petty corruption affects micro, small and medium firms (MSMEs)'s innovation in emerging economies. Innovators from emerging economies face considerably high bribing pressure from corrupt public officials and no or little institutional support for innovative firms (Kotabe, Jiang, & Murray, 2017). Corruption undermines the foundations of institutional trust, which is necessary to develop entrepreneurial and innovative activities. It has been argued that corruption increases transaction costs, which makes innovative opportunity much less attractive. Since innovators have been recognised as the main driver of long-term economic growth, a clear understanding of how corruption affects innovation can assist the MSMEs development. Our examination of the relationship between innovation and corruption uses firm-level data for 3368 MSMEs in South American countries. We observe some firms that pay bribes and others that do not, but a direct comparison between them leads to an identification problem because the engagement with bribery may correlate with unobserved determinants of firms. To overcome this potential bias, we use propensity score matching (PSM) to find a comparison group for individual firms in the bribe-paying group. After controlling for firm characteristics and taking care of firms' observable characteristics typically linked to innovation decisions, we find systematic differences in firm-level innovation activities associated with paying bribes. In particular, results indicate that the estimated average effect of paying bribes on innovation outcome for firms who engaged in bribery is 11 percent. However, significant heterogeneity in innovation and paying bribes is also observable. Empirically, we find that the average effect of paying bribes on innovations is significantly higher on process innovation outcome than product innovation. We also observe that with weaker institutions, the effects of bribery on innovation is more pronounced. The main knowledge contribution of this paper is twofold. First, to the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first investigation of innovation in MSMEs from the perspective of innovation and corruption, using cross country micro-data, which are rich and recent. Also, extending prior research, we further report a heterogeneity effect of paying bribes on product and process innovations. Prior innovation studies, which use micro-data, mainly examine a single country Comparative studies using micro-data focus on large firms in developed markets.Policy derived from these large firm and mature market studies seems problematic for MSMEs in emerging economies, given the size effects, corruption levels etc. Second, this study provides a fresh perspective to that of previous studies of corruption in emerging economies, highlighting the importance of formal institutions in dealing with corruption. While prior studies on the role of institutions has focused on mianly formal tension (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006, 2008), this study emphasizes the importance of the l...

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State ownership and corruption

Cited by 21 publications

References 33 publications

Gender and Corruption in Business

Gender and Corruption in Business

Direct and indirect influences of political regimes on corruption

Petty corruption on firm level innovation of MSMEs: Evidence from emerging economies

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