2020
DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2020.101763
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State ownership and stock liquidity: Evidence from privatization

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Cited by 33 publications
(37 citation statements)
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References 102 publications
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“…Our data consist of 574 firms from 64 countries privatized during 1981–2014. This sample compares favorably with those used in recent studies of privatized firms, such as Borisova and Megginson ( 2011 ), with a sample of 60 firms from 14 countries, Boubakri et al ( 2013 ), with 385 firms from 57 countries, and Boubakri et al ( 2020 ), with 473 firms from 53 countries.…”
Section: Sample Variables and Descriptive Statisticsmentioning
confidence: 80%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Our data consist of 574 firms from 64 countries privatized during 1981–2014. This sample compares favorably with those used in recent studies of privatized firms, such as Borisova and Megginson ( 2011 ), with a sample of 60 firms from 14 countries, Boubakri et al ( 2013 ), with 385 firms from 57 countries, and Boubakri et al ( 2020 ), with 473 firms from 53 countries.…”
Section: Sample Variables and Descriptive Statisticsmentioning
confidence: 80%
“…We argue that state ownership may create an advantage with respect to access to finance because SOEs benefit from implicit government guarantees, tax discounts, preferential access to credit, and other forms of soft budget constraints, particularly during times of financial distress (Borisova, Fotak, Holland, & Megginson, 2015 ; Borisova & Megginson, 2011 ; Boubakri, El Ghoul, Guedhami, & Megginson, 2018 ; Faccio, Masulis, & McConnell, 2006 ; Holland, 2019 ; Kornai et al, 2003 ; Nash, 2017 ; Boubakri, Chen, El Ghoul, Guedhami, & Nash, 2020 ). It follows that, as the level of state ownership increases, SOEs should suffer less from financial constraints and should have greater access to finance (Holland, 2019 ).…”
Section: State Ownership Country- and Firm-level Boundary Conditionsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Similarly, companies with weaker management may have reduced internal resources to curtail the "grabbing hand" of informal nonshareholding political connections. This would heighten demand for government-related shareholders to do so via demanding higher dividends (Benjamin et al 2016;Boubakri et al 2020;Yu and Wang 2020).…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Hence, the negative association between capital expenditure adjustment and the existence of a longstanding, informal political connection appears to be driven by companies with low corporate governance quality. This may partially reflect the presence of a "grabbing hand" effect in Malaysia (i.e., the informal political connection may expropriate corporate resources, leaving a diminished resource base available, for appropriation of dividends (Boubakri et al 2020;Yu and Wang 2020)). "Grabbing hand" mechanisms, in Malaysia, may be facilitated by regulators being partially "captured" by powerful businessmen and politicians (Vithiatharan and Gomez 2014).…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…They have been studied in the form of investor attention, media coverage, and episodes of sensational news exogenous to the market (Aouadi et al, 2018 ; Peress and Schmidt, 2020 ; Shyu et al, 2020 ; Cheng et al, 2021 ). Market structure reforms, such as state ownership transformation and tick size pilot programs, are still popular determinants of stock liquidity (Boubakri et al, 2020 ; Chung et al, 2020 ). Research has been conducted on the determinants of stock liquidity from very fresh perspectives, such as lawyer CEOs, mandatory CSR expenditure, as well as oil supply and demand shocks (Pham, 2020 ; Roy et al, 2022 ; Zhang and Wong, 2022 ).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%