State transformation and the evolution of economic nationalism in the East Asian developmental state: the Taiwanese semiconductor industry as case study

Abstract

This paper empirically highlights the role of nationalism in the development of the semiconductor industry in Taiwan. First, it demonstrates how the pre‐1980s Taiwanese developmental state mobilised Chinese economic nationalism against Japanese colonialism and Chinese communism and adopted the strategies of graduated sovereignty, selectively subsidising certain areas and sectors, and promoting national (homogeneously imagined) territorialisation to integrate with the international market. Second, the paper exhibits how in the late 1980s, when the outflow of capital to Mainland China became a compelling phenomenon and Taiwan democratised, popular sovereignty became the norm and Taiwanese nationalism emerged. In response, the democratised state started employing Taiwanese economic nationalism and implementing populist territorial policies to consolidate the support of ‘us’ (the Taiwanese/Taiwan) versus ‘them’ (the Chinese/China). This made China and everything related a security concern that had to be excluded as ‘the other’. This paper responds to the appeals of political geographers to give nationalism a central place in contemporary theories of the nation‐state and contributes to the theory of the developmental state by bringing ‘the nation’ back. While most of the existing developmental state literature focuses on how the roles and effects of ‘the state’ influence economic development, taking ‘the nation’ seriously can provide more accurate explanations for how and why the state focuses on development or not. Accordingly, through valuing the nation this paper promotes a theory of the developmental nation‐state.

Spatial Concentration in Relation to Industrial Resilience

“…Taiwan, as a leading supplier of global chip production, has a long history in the semiconductor industry. In the 1970s, a geopolitical economic crisis forced Taiwan to establish the semiconductor industry, even though it was a relatively new and capital-intensive technology for Taiwan at that time, and the investment capital exceeded most private firms [50]. This challenging strategy was rooted in a particular economic model, the developmental state strategy, which led towards rapid economic growth with positive government and strategic industrial policies [51,52].…”

Broken Circle: Premature Deindustrialization, Chinese Capital Exports, and the Stumbling Development of New Territorial Industrial Complexes

“…In some cases, this even allows for a sudden leapfrogging into the most advanced lines of production despite relatively low levels of GDP per capita, as when the Taiwanese developmental state funneled resources into programs designed to attract highly educated members of the Chinese diaspora from countries like the United States to develop the local semiconductor industry. 118 Thus, even within leading nations, future restructurings can create new rust belts and sunbelts as an economic crisis (in either its immediate sense or simply as longrun stagnation) is accompanied by cascading bankruptcies and relocations. Similarly, the windows of locational opportunity that emerge when entirely new product lines become possible can lead to sub-national as well as international relocation.…”

State Strategy in the Trans‐Local Branding of a Creative Industry Cluster: A Case Study of the Product Design Industry in Taipei

“…Three, the developmental state has become a branding curator for the trans‐local branding of creative clusters. While the developmental state is a central concept explaining the industrial upgrading and economic development in East Asian countries (Hsu 2017), state interventions are also involved in developing the creative economy (Chou 2012). In particular, the partnership between local branded firms and the state is actually facilitating the trans‐local branding of creative clusters by building a ‘global pipeline’ (Bathelt et al .…”