Static validation of security protocols

Abstract

We methodically expand protocol narrations into terms of a process algebra in order to specify some of the checks that need to be made in a protocol. We then apply static analysis technology to develop an automatic validation procedure for protocols. Finally, we demonstrate that these techniques suffice to identify several authentication flaws in symmetric and asymmetric key protocols such as Needham-Schroeder symmetric key, Otway-Rees, Yahalom, Andrew Secure RPC, Needham-Schroeder asymmetric key, and Beller-Chang-Yacobi MSR.

Non-repudiation Analysis with LySa

“…We refer to [2] [4] for a detailed description of the semantics. Notice that a substitution P[n 1 → n 2 ] substitutes all the free occurrences of n 1 in P for n 2 .…”

“…LYSA [2] is a process calculus in the π-calculus tradition that models security protocols on a global network. It incorporates pattern matching into the language constructs where values can become bound to variables.…”

“…We follow a different approach, the same as M. Buchholtz [5] and H. Gao [8], who show how some security properties can be analysed using the LYSA [2] process calculus with annotations and a Control Flow Analysis (CFA) to detect flaws in the protocols. The main idea is to extend LYSA with specific annotations, i.e.…”

Iterative Specialisation of Horn Clauses

“…[6,7]), but it is an interesting case study, because it proves troublesome for many analyses. In particular, independent attribute analyses, such as [8], will yield false positives for Yahalom, in the presence of several principals.…”

Relational Analysis for Delivery of Services

“…We use a polyadic π-calculus, pπ, extended with pattern matching in input prefixes (as in [2]) in order to write down the accident service formally (Table 1). For analysis purposes, action prefixes are annotated with labels.…”