Status Deficits and War

Abstract

Despite widespread agreement that status matters, there is relatively little in the way of focused research onhowandwhenit matters. Relying on the assumption that it “matters” has provided few extant theories of variation in states’ concern for status and little understanding of its specific implications for international conflict. I introduce a theory of status dissatisfaction (SD) that clarifies who forms the basis for status comparisons in world politics, when status concerns should be paramount, and how they are linked to international conflict. I demonstrate the viability of conflict as a strategy for status enhancement: both initiation and victory bring substantial status benefits over both five- and ten-year periods. Using a new, network-based measure of international status, I demonstrate that status deficits are significantly associated with an increased probability of war and militarized interstate dispute (MID) initiation. Even internationally, status is local: I use “community detection” algorithms to recover status communities and show that deficits within those communities are particularly salient for states and leaders.

Logics of stratified identity management in world politics

“…8 Similarly, Larson and Shevchenko's translation of SIT actually departs fairly substantially from the social psychological version of SIT. The latter framework distinguishes between individual 5 Renshon (2015Renshon ( , 2016Renshon ( , 2017. 6 Larson and Shevchenko (2010, 71, 72, 75) and Larson and Shevchenko (2014, Kindle location 1108, 1126.…”

“…Part of the 9 See Ward (2017a) for a more thorough discussion of this problem. 10 Renshon (2016Renshon ( , 2017. 11 Renshon (2017, 96) does note that social dominance orientation (an individual-level variable) influences the degree to which people care about status, but he argues that this variable is primarily interesting because most leaders will have high levels of SDO, which means that they will be, on average, more sensitive to status than nonleaders.…”

Destined for Misperception? Status Dilemma and the Early Origin of US-China Antagonism

“…Thus, a zerosum competition for status could occur as either the status quo's defender or the emerging power undertake symbolic acts to signal status preeminence at the expense of each other. As such, status competition is often characterized by intensified contests for military advantages and geopolitical influences [38][39][40][41][42]. Like the status dilemma, though, the security dilemma could arise out of reciprocal misperceptions of intention between the rising and status quo powers.…”

The Belt and Road Initiative in China's Emerging Grand Strategy of Connective Leadership

“…Seen in this perspective, China's effort to complement the development strategies of the countries involved in the BRI by leveraging their comparative strengths through policy coordination, infrastructural connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration and people-to-people exchanges amounts as much to an institutionalized provision of public goods to match such would-be raison de système, as it responds to the profit-seeking logics of the current international economic order. (Renshon, 2016). Casting the BRI as an operational agenda emanating from their redefined raison de système proposition, Chinese leaders attempt to mitigate the regional capabilities turbulences determined by China's re-emergence by soliciting confidence in their commitment to pursuing mutually beneficial arrangements.…”

“…It is also a vehicle to socialize them to an informal hierarchy reflecting China's rising status within its region. States seek status commensurate with their capabilities because it is a valuable resource for coordinating expectations of dominance and deference in strategic interactions (Renshon, 2016), and because elites in secondary states can internalize norms that are articulated by a leading state and, therefore, favor policies consistent with its notion of international order (Ikenberry and Kupchan, 1990). An informal hierarchy does not entail a shared system of governance and stops well short of a hegemonic design: it rests on a looser notion of superordinate/subordinate relationships that both sides recognize as legitimate (Hobson and Sharman, 2005).…”