Status in Markets

Ball, Sheryl; Eckel, Catherine C.; Grossman, Philip J.; Zame, William R.

doi:10.1162/003355301556374

Cited by 309 publications

(247 citation statements)

References 9 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

230

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…When social and economic status go together, as often in human life, the pursuit of social status is reinforced by the greater entitlement to economic resources. Theoretical and experimental research into the consequences of status-seeking includes Ball et al (2001), Brown et al (2008), Clark andOswald (1998), Frank (1985), Oswald and Powdthavee (2007), and Rablen (2008).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mortality and immortality: The Nobel Prize as an experiment into the effect of status upon longevity

Rablen

Oswald

2008

Journal of Health Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

It has been known for centuries that the rich and famous have longer lives than the poor and ordinary. Causality, however, remains trenchantly debated. The ideal experiment would be one in which extra status could somehow be dropped upon a sub-sample of individuals while those in a control group of comparable individuals received none. This paper attempts to formulate a test in that spirit. It collects 19th-century birth data on science Nobel Prize winners. Correcting for potential biases, we estimate that winning the Prize, compared to merely being nominated, is associated with between 1 and 2 years of extra longevity.JEL classification: I12

show abstract

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mortality and immortality: The Nobel Prize as an experiment into the effect of status upon longevity

Rablen

Oswald

2008

Journal of Health Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Another relevant factor might be status differences linked with gender stereotypes. Women are stereotypically of lower status than men and thus might expect to get less or be expected to be content with less (Ball et al 2001, Schwieren, 2003, leading to lower amounts sent to them in the role of B. Men are assumed to be more risk-taking than women and more keen on gambling.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Trust in cooperation or ability? An experimental study on gender differences

Schwieren

Sutter²

2008

Economics Letters

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Matthias Sutter Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may University of Innsbruck and University of GöteborgAbstract: We examine gender differences in trust in another party's cooperation (CC) or its ability (AC). While men and women do not differ concerning trust in cooperation, gender has a strong influence when trust in another subject's ability is required.JEL-classification: C72, C91

show abstract

“…21 Laboratory experiments have shown that the acceptance of offers crucially depends on the set of alternatives from which the offer has been picked (Falk et al,20 A general survey of the economic literature of social status is given by Weiss & Fershtman (1998). 21 Ball and Eckel (1998) and Ball et al (2001) test experimentally the relation between status differentials and market interactions. In contrast to our setting, they introduce ad hoc a status hierarchy that offers little information about participants' wealth or prestige.…”

Section: Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Reciprocity and Status in a Virtual Field Experiment

Nicklisch

Salz²

2008

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This article reports on a field study that has been conducted in the online computer game World of Warcraft. In a basic labor situation a principal gives an upfront wage to an agent (who is unaware that he is participating in an experiment) and asks him to conduct a real-effort task. The unique characteristic of the virtual world allows us to control for agents' abilities to perform the task and to manipulate the principal's social status. Confirming gift exchange theory, generous wages indeed increase agents' efforts, even controlling for agents' abilities, while the principals' social status influences effort provision probability substantially. We interpret this result such that agents assess the kindness of the wages with respect to the expected principals' wealth.

show abstract

Status in Markets

Cited by 309 publications

References 9 publications

Mortality and immortality: The Nobel Prize as an experiment into the effect of status upon longevity

Mortality and immortality: The Nobel Prize as an experiment into the effect of status upon longevity

Trust in cooperation or ability? An experimental study on gender differences

Reciprocity and Status in a Virtual Field Experiment

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About