Steady-state analysis of social responsibility strategy of coal power enterprises from the perspective of game theory

Guo, Bang; Li, Yixin; Wang, Xinping

doi:10.1016/j.heliyon.2023.e23124

Heliyon

2024

DOI: 10.1016/j.heliyon.2023.e23124

|View full text |Cite

Steady-state analysis of social responsibility strategy of coal power enterprises from the perspective of game theory

Bang Guo,

Yixin Li,

Xinping Wang

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...

Citation Types

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Year Published

2024

Publication Types

Select...

Article2

Relationship

Self Cite0

Independent2

Authors

Journals

Cited by 2 publications

References 44 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

Evolutionary game analysis of carbon emission reduction in transportation infrastructure construction under dual regulation

Zhang,

Chen

2024

Heliyon

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Evolutionary game analysis of carbon emission reduction in transportation infrastructure construction under dual regulation

Zhang,

Chen

2024

Heliyon

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Reducing Carbon Emissions from Coal-Fired Power Plants: An Analysis Using Evolutionary Game Theory

Gao,

Tan,

Cui

2024

Sustainability

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The promotion of energy conservation and emission reduction involves a multi-party game among governments, enterprises, and other stakeholders. To explore the game relationships among governments, the public, and coal-fired power enterprises under the “dual carbon targets”, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model for energy conservation and emission reduction involving three parties: the government, coal-fired power enterprises, and the public. Through a theoretical analysis and simulation analysis of the case study involving a central Hebei energy enterprise in China, the impact of parameter variations on the strategic choices of all parties and the evolutionarily stable strategies of the system is thoroughly discussed. The research findings indicate that reducing public supervision costs, increasing government rewards, subsidies, and penalties, and enhancing government regulatory capabilities are crucial factors in promoting energy-saving and emission-reduction efforts by coal-fired power enterprises. After multiple evolutionary iterations, the tripartite evolutionary game system ultimately reaches an evolutionarily stable state of government regulation, public supervision, and energy-saving and emission-reduction by coal-fired power enterprises at the point E8(1,1,1). Based on these findings, we propose a series of policy recommendations aimed at providing theoretical support for the Chinese government to achieve its energy-saving and emission-reduction strategies under the dual-carbon targets. These recommendations also offer practical guidance for the government in formulating emission reduction policies, for enterprises in optimizing their operational strategies, and for the public in participating in emission reduction efforts.

show abstract

scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.

Contact Info

customersupport@researchsolutions.com

10624 S. Eastern Ave., Ste. A-614

Henderson, NV 89052, USA

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.

Blog Terms and Conditions API Terms Privacy Policy Contact Cookie Preferences Do Not Sell or Share My Personal Information

Made with 💙 for researchers

Part of the Research Solutions Family.

Steady-state analysis of social responsibility strategy of coal power enterprises from the perspective of game theory

Cited by 2 publications

References 44 publications

Evolutionary game analysis of carbon emission reduction in transportation infrastructure construction under dual regulation

Evolutionary game analysis of carbon emission reduction in transportation infrastructure construction under dual regulation

Reducing Carbon Emissions from Coal-Fired Power Plants: An Analysis Using Evolutionary Game Theory

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About