Steady states in matching and bargaining

Manea, Mihai

doi:10.1016/j.jet.2016.10.003

Cited by 10 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…Their proof assumes the quadratic-meeting technology; later, Noldeke and Troger (2009) showed existence under the technically harder linear-meeting technology. Manea (2017) recently dispensed with the quadratic assumption, deducing existence in a larger class of stationary search and matching models when there is a finite number of types.…”

Section: Sorting With Random Search and Perfectly Transferable Utilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Sorting through Search and Matching Models in Economics

Chade

Eeckhout²,

Smith

2017

Journal of Economic Literature

154

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Toward understanding assortative matching, this is a self-contained introduction to research on search and matching. We first explore the nontransferable and perfectly transferable utility matching paradigms, and then a unifying imperfectly transferable utility matching model. Motivated by some unrealistic predictions of frictionless matching, we flesh out the foundational economics of search theory. We then revisit the original matching paradigms with search frictions. We finally allow informational frictions that often arise, such as in college-student sorting. (JEL C78, D82, D83, I23, J12)

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Section: Sorting With Random Search and Perfectly Transferable Utilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Sorting through Search and Matching Models in Economics

Chade

Eeckhout²,

Smith

2017

Journal of Economic Literature

154

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“…Shimer and Smith (2000), Atakan (2006), Lauermann and Nöldeke (2015) and Manea (2017) provided theoretical studies of equilibrium existence.…”

Section: A Brief Review Of the Literature On Marriage And Intrahouseholdmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In the standard search model, singles meet mates sequentially; they share resources according to Nash bargaining with singlehood as threat point; marriage is realized if there exists a jointly profitable resource allocation; the distributions of individual types by gender and marital status are calculated at the steady-state equilibrium. Shimer and Smith (2000), Atakan (2006), Lauermann and Nöldeke (2015) and Manea (2017) provided theoretical studies of equilibrium existence.…”

Section: A Brief Review Of the Literature On Marriage And Intrahouseholdmentioning

confidence: 99%

Marriage, Labor Supply, and Home Production

Goussé¹,

Jacquemet²,

Robin³

2017

Econometrica

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We develop a search model of marriage where men and women draw utility from private consumption and leisure, and from a non-market good that is produced in the home using time resources. We condition individual decisions on wages, education, and an index of family attitudes. A match-specific, stochastic bliss shock induces variation in matching given wages, education, and family values, and triggers renegotiation and divorce. Using BHPS (1991-2008) data, we take as given changes in wages, education, and family values by gender, and study their impact on marriage decisions and intrahousehold resource allocation. The model allows to evaluate how much of the observed gender differences in labor supply results from wages, education, and family attitudes. We find that family attitudes are a strong determinant of comparative advantages in home production of men and women, whereas education complementarities induce assortative mating through preferences.

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“…Both inflows and outflows are endogenously determined: entry decisions hinge on how entry costs compare to payoffs in the bargaining game, while the balance of bargaining power and incentives for trade depend on the matching probabilities in the underlying market. Manea (2014) shows that the bargaining model admits a steady state for every configuration of sufficiently small entry costs.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 98%

“…The uniqueness result from the latter model implies that any candidate steady state market composition is consistent with a unique payoff profile in equilibrium. Building on this result, Manea (2014) characterizes steady states in a version of the benchmark bargaining game in which new traders face type-dependent entry costs and optimally decide whether to join the market. In a steady state, the measure of players of each type who choose to enter the market needs to match the measure of players of the same type who trade and exit the game.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%