Stealthy MTD Against Unsupervised Learning-Based Blind FDI Attacks in Power Systems

Higgins, Martin; Teng, Fei; Parisini, Thomas

doi:10.1109/tifs.2020.3027148

Cited by 40 publications

(18 citation statements)

References 35 publications

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“…Esmalifalak et al [70] proposed an independent component analysis (ICA) algorithm to speculate the matrix H from power flow measurements. Higgins et al [71] proposed a data prepossessing before the ICA process. The proposed data classification is through T-distributed stochastic neighbor embedding (T-SNE) for dimensional reduction.…”

Section: ) Blind Fdi Attacksmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…When the attacker knows the historical bus power injections and relative voltage phase angles, the measurement matrix H can be estimated. In cases where attackers can not distinguish the eavesdropped measurement corresponding to the current system topology, Higgins et al [71] proposed an unsupervised learning method to cluster the data set via the density based spatial clustering of application with noise (DBSCAN) algorithm.…”

Section: ) Blind Fdi Attacksmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Smart Grid Cyber-Physical Attack and Defense: A Review

2021

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Recent advances in the cyber-physical smart grid (CPSG) have enabled a broad range of new devices based on the information and communication technology (ICT). However, these ICT-enabled devices are susceptible to a growing threat of cyber-physical attacks. This paper performs a thorough review of the state-of-the-art cyber-physical security of the smart grid. By focusing on the physical layer of the CPSG, this paper provides an abstracted and unified state-space model, in which cyber-physical attack and defense models can be effectively generalized. The existing cyber-physical attacks are categorized in terms of their target components. We then discuss several operational and informational defense approaches that present the current state-of-the-art in the field, including moving target defense, watermarking, and datadriven approaches. Finally, we discuss challenges and future opportunities associated with the smart grid cyber-physical security. INDEX TERMS Cyber-physical power system, cyber-physical security, false data injection, dynamic watermarking, moving target defense.

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Section: ) Blind Fdi Attacksmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: ) Blind Fdi Attacksmentioning

confidence: 99%

Smart Grid Cyber-Physical Attack and Defense: A Review

2021

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“…MTD can also be enhanced to camouflage its existence to minimise the potential for attackers circumventing MTD [22,23]. However, as shown in [24], the cost of application will mean the system operator will want to minimise the overall use of MTD to only those times when the system is potentially under attack.…”

Section: Moving Target Defencementioning

confidence: 99%

Enhanced cyber‐physical security using attack‐resistant cyber nodes and event‐triggered moving target defence

Higgins

Mayes

Teng

2021

IET Cyber-Phy Sys Theory & Ap

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A cyber‐physical authentication strategy to protect power system infrastructure against false data injection (FDI) attacks is outlined. The authors demonstrate that it is feasible to use small, low‐cost, yet highly attack‐resistant security chips as measurement nodes, enhanced with an event‐triggered moving target defence (MTD), to offer effective cyber‐physical security. At the cyber layer, the proposed solution is based on the MULTOS Trust‐Anchor chip, using an authenticated encryption protocol, offering cryptographically protected and chained reports at up to 12/s. The availability of the Trust‐Anchors allows the grid controller to delegate aspects of passive anomaly detection, supporting local as well as central alarms. In this context, a distributed event‐triggered MTD protocol is implemented at the physical layer to complement cyber side enhancement. This protocol applies a distributed anomaly detection scheme based on Holt‐Winters seasonal forecasting in combination with MTD implemented via inductance perturbation. The scheme is shown to be effective at preventing or detecting a wide range of attacks against power system measurement system.

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“…Moreover, Higgins et.al. [22] suggests to perturb the reactance through Gaussian watermarking to prevent the attacker from inferring the new system parameters.…”

Section: A Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Hidden MTD is recently proposed by [19]- [22] to design MTD that cannot be detected by the attacker. After triggering MTD, the new measurement z N is no longer in H N .…”

Section: Hiddenness Of Mtdmentioning

confidence: 99%

Robust Moving Target Defence Against False Data Injection Attacks in Power Grids

Xu¹,

Jaimoukha²,

Teng

2021

Preprint

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Recently, moving target defence (MTD) has been proposed to thwart the false data injection (FDI) attacks in power system state estimation by proactively triggering the distributed flexible AC transmission system (D-FACTS) devices. One of the key challenges for MTD in power grid is to design its real-time implementation with performance guarantees against unknown attacks. To tackle this, a novel robust MTD strategy is proposed to guarantee the worst-case detection rate against all unknown attacks in noisy environment. We first theoretically prove that, for any given MTD strategy, the minimal principal angle between subspaces corresponds to the worst-case performance against all potential attacks. Based on this, robust MTD algorithms are then formulated for the systems with both complete and incomplete configurations. In addition, this paper proposes the concept of robust hidden MTD under noisy environment, which is shown to alleviate the contradiction between the effectiveness and the hiddenness of MTD. Extensive simulations using standard IEEE benchmarks demonstrate the improved average and worst-case performances of MTD by using the proposed algorithms.

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Stealthy MTD Against Unsupervised Learning-Based Blind FDI Attacks in Power Systems

Cited by 40 publications

References 35 publications

Smart Grid Cyber-Physical Attack and Defense: A Review

Smart Grid Cyber-Physical Attack and Defense: A Review

Enhanced cyber‐physical security using attack‐resistant cyber nodes and event‐triggered moving target defence

Robust Moving Target Defence Against False Data Injection Attacks in Power Grids

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