Stealthy Vices

Cassam, Quassim

doi:10.1093/oso/9780198826903.003.0007

Cited by 27 publications

(42 citation statements)

References 9 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…The first element links the characterisation of normal versus abnormal irrationalities to some of the things virtue epistemologists like Linda Zagzebski say. The epistemic vices of intellectual pride and conformity are things for which we are responsible and can exercise control (Zagzebski, 1996, p. 60, see also Cassam 2015a, 2015b.…”

Section: Epistemic Responsibilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

The clinical significance of anomalous experience in the explanation of monothematic delusions

Noordhof

Sullivan-Bissett

2021

Synthese

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Monothematic delusions involve a single theme, and often occur in the absence of a more general delusional belief system. They are cognitively atypical insofar as they are said to be held in the absence of evidence, are resistant to correction, and have bizarre contents. Empiricism about delusions has it that anomalous experience is causally implicated in their formation, whilst rationalism has it that delusions result from top down malfunctions from which anomalous experiences can follow. Within empiricism, two approaches to the nature of the abnormality/abnormalities involved have been touted by philosophers and psychologists. One-factor approaches have it that monothematic delusions are a normal response to anomalous experiences whilst two-factor approaches seek to identify a clinically abnormal pattern of reasoning in addition to anomalous experience to explain the resultant delusion. In this paper we defend a one-factor approach. We begin by making clear what we mean by atypical, abnormal, and factor. We then identify the phenomenon of interest (monothematic delusion) and overview one and two-factor empiricism about its formation. We critically evaluate the cases for various second factors, and find them all wanting. In light of this we turn to our one-factor account, identifying two ways in which ‘normal response’ may be understood, and how this bears on the discussion of one-factor theories up until this point. We then conjecture that what is at stake is a certain view about the epistemic responsibility of subjects with delusions, and the role of experience, in the context of familiar psychodynamic features. After responding to two objections, we conclude that the onus is on two-factor theorists to show that the one-factor account is inadequate. Until then, the one-factor account ought to be understood as the default position for explaining monothematic delusion formation and retention. We don’t rule out the possibility that, for particular subjects with delusions there may be a second factor at work causally implicated in their delusory beliefs but, until the case for the inadequacy of the single factor is made, the second factor is redundant and fails to pick out the minimum necessary for a monothematic delusion to be present.

show abstract

Section: Epistemic Responsibilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

The clinical significance of anomalous experience in the explanation of monothematic delusions

Noordhof

Sullivan-Bissett

2021

Synthese

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Closed-mindedness with respect to beliefs about one's pets may be the result of emotional attachment to those particular beliefs or to the pets themselves 29 . Whereas, when closed-mindedness is a more general disposition, spanning multiple domains, it might be motivated by a general need for closure (Cassam Forthcoming), or by a general lack of curiosity. Or, by a general disposition to be lazy, or arrogant, or to mistrust other people.…”

Section: The Disposition Of Closed-mindedness and Closed-minded Actionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Closed-Mindedness and Dogmatism

Battaly¹

2018

Episteme

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The primary goal of this paper is to propose a working analysis of the disposition of closed-mindedness. I argue that closed-mindedness (CM) is an unwillingness or inability to engage (seriously) with relevant intellectual options. Dogmatism (DG) is one kind of closed-mindedness: it is an unwillingness to engage seriously with relevant alternatives to the beliefs one already holds. I do not assume that the disposition of closed-mindedness is always an intellectual vice; rather I treat the analysis of the disposition, and its status as an intellectual vice, as separate questions. The concluding section develops a framework for determining the conditions under which closed-mindedness will be an intellectual vice.

show abstract

“…Hence, these intellectual vices are somewhat stealthy; that is to say, they are hard to detect in oneself (Cassam 2015). The same psychological mechanisms that drive one from ingratiation or self-silencing to low self-esteem function to conceal the inappropriateness of the negative self-assessment.…”

Section: Some Epistemic Harmsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Intellectual Servility and Timidity

Tanesini¹

2018

Journal of Philosophical Research

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Intellectual servility is a vice opposing proper pride about one's intellectual achievements. Intellectual timidity is also a vice; it is manifested in a lack of proper concern for others' esteem. This paper offers an account of the nature of these vices and details some of the epistemic harms that flow from them. I argue that servility, which is often the result of suffering humiliation, is a form of damaged self-esteem. It is underpinned by attitudes serving social-adjustive functions and causes ingratiating behaviors. Timidity, which is habituated through self-silencing, is underpinned by negative attitudes toward the intellectual worth of the self, which serve a defensive function. Like servility, timidity is an obstacle to the acquisition and transmission of knowledge and especially knowledge about oneself.

show abstract

Stealthy Vices

Cited by 27 publications

References 9 publications

The clinical significance of anomalous experience in the explanation of monothematic delusions

The clinical significance of anomalous experience in the explanation of monothematic delusions

Closed-Mindedness and Dogmatism

Intellectual Servility and Timidity

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About