Stereotypes, theory of mind, and the action–prediction hierarchy

Westra, Evan

doi:10.1007/s11229-017-1575-9

Cited by 42 publications

(48 citation statements)

References 140 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…Several suggested biases could influence which perspective is taken. A cooperative bias (Helming, Strickland, & Jacob, 2016;Westra, 2017) leads children to focus on where Max's chocolate is to help him find it. 5 Also several referential biases may be operative.…”

Section: Perspectivementioning

confidence: 99%

Mental files: Developmental integration of dual naming and theory of mind

Doherty

Perner

2020

Developmental Review

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We use mental files theory to provide an integral theory of children's diverse dual naming problems and why these problems are overcome when children pass the false belief test. When an object is encountered under different appearances or given different verbal labels, two distinct representations (mental files) may be deployed for that single object. The resulting files refer to the same object but capture different perspectives on the object. Such coreferential files can thus be used to represent people's differing perspectives (e.g., belief). Typically the existence of different files indicates the existence of two separate objects. To mark that only a single object is involved, coreferential files need to be linked. Development of the ability to link files provides a powerful developmental explanation for success on dual labelling and perspective tasks at the same age, around 4 years: processing identity statements, overcoming mutual exclusivity (accepting different labels for an object), visual perspective taking, and understanding differences of belief. Mental files also provide a new framework for understanding conceptual pacts and their relation to mutual exclusivity in children and adults.

show abstract

Section: Perspectivementioning

confidence: 99%

Mental files: Developmental integration of dual naming and theory of mind

Doherty

Perner

2020

Developmental Review

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…To overcome this Interaction Problem, Westra (2017Westra ( , 2018 proposes that different types of attributions are integrated in a hierarchical framework of action-prediction, in line with recent other hierarchical predictive coding accounts of the mind (Hohwy 2013;Clark 2016) and, in particular, mindreading (Koster-Hale and Saxe 2013; de Bruin and Strijbos 2015). The rough idea of Westra's specific account is that expectations and hypotheses about more transient states of mind, such as particular goals and behaviors in particular circumstances, are constrained and shaped by expectations and hypotheses about more temporally stable states of mind, such as long-term goals and beliefs, which are, in turn, constrained and shaped by even more temporally stable states of mind, such as character traits.…”

Section: The Interaction Problemmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…4. Here I will discuss Westra's (2017Westra's ( , 2018 hierarchical predictive coding framework as a more unified theory of folk psychological theorizing, and outline three worries related to the proposed priority of trait attribution and the proposed ubiquity of different types of mental-state and trait attribution. As an alternative solution to the Interaction Problem, I suggest looking towards model theory (Maibom 2003(Maibom , 2007Godfrey-Smith 2005;Spaulding 2018).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Traits, beliefs and dispositions in a pluralistic folk psychology

Ghijsen

2019

Synthese

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

According to pluralistic folk psychology (PFP) we make use of a variety of methods to predict and explain each other, only one of which makes use of attributing propositional attitudes. I discuss three related problems for this view: first, the prediction problem, according to which (some of) PFP's methods of prediction only work if they also assume a tacit attribution of propositional attitudes; second, the interaction problem, according to which PFP cannot explain how its different methods of prediction and explanation can interact; and third, the difference problem, according to which PFP cannot explain how all of its methods are truly different if it also assumes a dispositionalist account of belief. I argue that a promising solution to these problems should not overestimate the importance and ubiquity of propositional attitude attribution even if the difference between propositional attitude attribution and other types of attribution is a matter of degree rather than kind. Instead, a solution should be sought in a better appreciation of the breadth of folk psychological theorizing and the way in which this can be incorporated into model theory. Keywords Theory of mind • Pluralistic folk psychology • Social cognition • Hierarchical predictive coding • Character traits • Model theory • Dispositionalism This work is part of the research programme "Should we trust our own eyes? Epistemic challenges from cognitive penetration and implicit bias" with Project No. 275-20-056, which is financed by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO).

show abstract

“…Importantly, these cognitive processes deeply influence how we interpret others' behavior and how we expect them to behave in the future or in counterfactual scenarios. This research suggests that stereotypes, character traits, and social biases play an important role in mindreading (Spaulding, ; Westra, , ).…”

Section: Going Beyond Beliefmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Westra (, ) gives a very different type of account of the role of character traits and stereotypes in mindreading. On Westra's view, character traits and stereotypes are not alternatives to attributing belief and desires, like they are on most pluralistic folk psychology views.…”

Section: Theories Of Mindreading Beyond Beliefmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mindreading beyond belief: A more comprehensive conception of how we understand others

Spaulding

2018

Philosophy Compass

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Traditional theories of mindreading tend to focus exclusively on attributing beliefs and desires to other agents.The literature emphasizes belief attribution in particular, with numerous debates over when children develop the concept of belief, how neurotypical adult humans attribute beliefs to others, whether non-human animals have the concept of belief, etc. I describe a growing school of thought that the heavy focus on belief leaves traditional theories of mindreading unable to account for the complexity, diversity, and messiness of ordinary social interactions. I present a few broader, more comprehensive conceptions of mindreading that take into account how stereotypes, character trait inferences, social biases, and more influence how we understand and interact with others. These broader conceptions of mindreading promise to be more empirically adequate and have fruitful application to various debates in philosophy and cognitive science. | INTRODUCTIONIn our ordinary lives, we regularly think about what others are thinking and doing. I try to figure out why my mother never picks up on my sometimes not-so-subtle signals that I need to work rather than chat, I wonder what my daughter's preschool teacher thinks about her, or I think about how a friend will handle an impending divorce. We think about others ' beliefs, desires, intentions, preferences, character traits, values, etc. all the time in part because we find this intrinsically interesting but also because we find this useful for understanding what others' will do and perhaps how we can manipulate the situation for our own purposes. Our ordinary ways of understanding what others think and do is called folk psychology. The specific practice of attributing mental states to others in order to explain ---

show abstract

Stereotypes, theory of mind, and the action–prediction hierarchy

Cited by 42 publications

References 140 publications

Mental files: Developmental integration of dual naming and theory of mind

Mental files: Developmental integration of dual naming and theory of mind

Traits, beliefs and dispositions in a pluralistic folk psychology

Mindreading beyond belief: A more comprehensive conception of how we understand others

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About