Stigma and Self-Fulfilling Expectations of Criminality

Rasmusen, Eric Bennett

doi:10.1086/467358

Cited by 245 publications

(106 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…Posner (1997) discusses the interplay between social norms and the law. Glaeser et al (1996), Rasmusen (1996) and Weibull and Villa (2005), among others, provide crime theories based on peer pressure, stigmatization and internalized social norms, which emphasize the potential for multiple equilibria. Furuya (2002), Blume (2003) and Funk (2004) emphasize how stigmatization may deter crime, but also raise recidivism of those stigmatized.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“Thou shalt not covet”: Prohibitions, temptation and moral values

Cervellati

Vanin

2013

Journal of Public Economics

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SummaryWe propose a theory studying temptation in presence of both externally and internally sanctioned prohibitions. Moral values that (internally) sanction prohibited actions and their desire may increase utility by reducing self-control costs, thereby serving as partial commitment devices. We apply the model to crime and study the conditions under which agents would optimally adhere to moral values of honesty. Incentives to be moral are nonmonotonic in the crime premium. Larger external punishments increase temptation and demand for morality, so that external and internal sanctions are complements. The model helps rationalizing stylized facts that proved difficult to explain with available theories. Keywords AbstractWe propose a theory studying temptation in presence of both externally and internally sanctioned prohibitions. Moral values that (internally) sanction prohibited actions and their desire may increase utility by reducing self-control costs, thereby serving as partial commitment devices. We apply the model to crime and study the conditions under which agents would optimally adhere to moral values of honesty. Incentives to be moral are nonmonotonic in the crime premium. Larger external punishments increase temptation and demand for morality, so that external and internal sanctions are complements. The model helps rationalizing stylized facts that proved difficult to explain with available theories. JEL-classification: D03, K42, Z13

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Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“Thou shalt not covet”: Prohibitions, temptation and moral values

Cervellati

Vanin

2013

Journal of Public Economics

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“…When several persons are subject to some rule and sanctions capacity is constrained, the subjects face interdependent choices: The higher the prevalence of violation, the less the risk of sanction for any given violator. This idea is referred to as ''enforcement swamping'' (11) or the ''overload theory'' (12) and is well known in the deterrence (11)(12)(13)(14)(15)(16)(17) and urban riot (18) literatures. The result can be a 2-equilibrium ''tipping'' situation, in which both high and low violation rates are self-sustaining, and temporary interventions can therefore have lasting consequences if they push the system across the tipping point (19,20).…”

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confidence: 99%

The dynamics of deterrence

Kleiman¹,

Kilmer

2009

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

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Because punishment is scarce, costly, and painful, optimal enforcement strategies will minimize the amount of actual punishment required to effectuate deterrence. If potential offenders are sufficiently deterrable, increasing the conditional probability of punishment (given violation) can reduce the amount of punishment actually inflicted, by ''tipping'' a situation from its high-violation equilibrium to its low-violation equilibrium. Compared to random or ''equal opportunity'' enforcement, dynamically concentrated sanctions can reduce the punishment level necessary to tip the system, especially if preceded by warnings. Game theory and some simple and robust Monte Carlo simulations demonstrate these results, which, in addition to their potential for reducing crime and incarceration, may have implications for both management and regulation.crime ͉ enforcement ͉ game theory ͉ positive feedback ͉ tipping H umans cooperate; the extent of cooperation among humans marks them out from all other species (1, 2). But cooperation is vulnerable to exploitation through aggression, deception, opportunistic defection from agreements, and free-riding. Where cooperative strategies are suboptimal for individuals, mutually beneficial arrangements will fail to arise, or will degenerate (3-5).Under experimental conditions, some individuals will voluntarily incur costs to themselves to punish noncooperative behavior; doing so can facilitate cooperation by reducing the potential gains from exploitation (1, 4, 6). Thus punishment is a basic element of human social interaction.As punishment is always costly, both to the punisher and (obviously) to those punished, a well-designed enforcement system should combine high efficacy in discouraging exploitative behavior with low actual infliction of sanctions. At first blush, it might seem that these 2 objectives are in fundamental tension; that more compliance requires more punishment. But 3 law-enforcement examples seem to support the contrary proposition.First, when the New York City Police Department implemented a ''zero tolerance'' policy toward ''squeegeeing''-penny-ante extortion involving wiping the windshields of cars stuck in traffic and then ''requesting'' payment from the drivers-by arresting every squeegee-man observed plying his trade, the number of actual arrests for squeegeeing went down, not up (7). The same happened when the New York City Transit Police cracked down on ''turnstile-jumping.'' Second, police in High Point, NC, who had been sporadically arresting drug dealers in a long-established crack market for 2 decades and finding that every arrestee was quickly replaced, changed strategies. They identified all of the currently active dealers in that market and developed felony cases against them, but arrested and prosecuted only 3 dealers who had been involved in violence. They then held a meeting with the remaining dealers and announced that anyone who continued to sell drugs would face certain prison time. Soon after, the market disappeared, and the number of crack-deali...

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“…can be interpreted as the stigma effect from previous convictions (Rasmussen, 1996, Funk, 2004, and the result of fines.…”

Section: Theoretical Considerations: Custodial and Noncustodial Sentementioning

confidence: 99%

Crime, prosecutors, and the certainty of conviction

Entorf

Spengler

2013

Eur J Law Econ

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. www.econstor.eu The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit organization supported by Deutsche Post Foundation. The center is associated with the University of Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public. Terms of use: Documents in D I S C U S S I O N P A P E R S E R I E SIZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be available directly from the author. This paper tests predictions of a structural, augmented supply-of-offenders model regarding the relative effects of police, public prosecution and courts, respectively, on crime. Using detailed data on the different stages of the criminal prosecution process in Germany, empirical evidence suggests that public prosecutors and their influence on the probability of conviction play a major role in explaining the variation of crime rates, while the impact of the severity of punishment is small and insignificant.JEL Classification: K14, K41, C23

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Stigma and Self-Fulfilling Expectations of Criminality

Cited by 245 publications

References 22 publications

“Thou shalt not covet”: Prohibitions, temptation and moral values

“Thou shalt not covet”: Prohibitions, temptation and moral values

The dynamics of deterrence

Crime, prosecutors, and the certainty of conviction

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